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ABSTRACT
While much research has been done concerning other factors affecting foreign
policy, there have been few attempts to understand how culture affects foreign policy.
This is in spite of the fact that many scholars have commented on the relevance of
culture to foreign policy outcomes. The object of this research project is to
demonstrate how a specific form of culture, how a state perceives its role in the
world, affects foreign policy decision-making. Also, this research project seeks to
demonstrate that this form of culture is rooted deep in the past but evolves due to
transition in the social characteristics of the international system. As culture evolves,
specific patterns of decision-making manifest themselves. The specific patterns of
decision-making to be analyzed in this project are Turkey and China in the period
between WWI and the end of the Cold War. A comparison of Turkish and Chinese
decision-making under similar circumstances, the Turkish decision to comply with
American demands in the Cyprus crisis of 1964 and the Chinese decision to ignore
Soviet attempts to deter the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979, will provide a more
focused depiction of how differing cultural perspectives affect the way leaders
understand their foreign policy alternatives and affect their decisions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: BASIC ISSUES, METHOD AND
OUTLINE

In his attempt to provide a new understanding of the workings of the
international system, Alexander Wendt claims that to understand state behavior in the
international system, one must be aware of both the constitutive effects of the
international system that influence a given state and the domestic factors at work
within that state (1999: 28). Although Wendt does not particularly seek to understand
the behavior of specific states, his claim illuminates two important criticisms that
have been raised concerning the state of theory in the field of international relations.
First, while rational choice studies have contributed to some extent to our
understanding of foreign policy and decision making (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Mor
1991), many have decried the inability of rational choice attempts to explain much of
what is interesting and important pertaining to international relations (Green and
Shapiro 1994). This has led to the recent strong interest in cognitive approaches to
the study of international politics. A second issue that has been raised is the poverty
of analyzing international relations at a single level of observation, whether it be the
individual level, the national level, or the systemic level. Many studies have
attempted to demonstrate the primacy of one level of analysis while ignoring other
levels, leading to a situation where much that may be important is discounted. These
1

two criticisms are particularly relevant to Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International
Politics (1979), widely held to be the most influential piece of international relations
research in the last quarter century (Goldman 1996: 403).
Not only have these two issues been important in the study of international
relations, but also in the related field of foreign policy. Foreign policy studies are an
outgrowth of international relations and decision making studies (Snyder, et al, 1962).
While there have been attempts to form a general theory of foreign policy, (Rosenau,
1966) this goal has not been achieved, largely because of the complexity of the field.
Foreign policy studies are in some ways even more complex than international
relations, because of the variety of approaches and methods involved. The nature of
foreign policy studies is summed up by one foreign policy scholar as " .. . somewhat
unusual in that it deals with both domestic and international arenas, jumping from
individual to state to systemic levels of analysis, and attempts to integrate all of these
aspects into a coherent whole" (Gerner 1995: 17). In other words, there are factors
both inside and outside the state that affect its foreign policy. Those favoring an
inside approach advocate inquiries involving factors such as perception,
psychological needs, and cultural influences (Legg and Morrison 1981). Advocates
of an outside approach such as Waltz (1979) or Wendt (1999), attempt to understand
the ramifications of international structures. The difference between outside and
inside approaches has been referred to as the difference between explaining and
understanding (Hollis and Smith, 1990). The objective of this study is to develop a
model of foreign policy analysis that accounts both for cognitive or constructivist
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(inside) factors and systemic (outside) influences on foreign policy, and also to
illuminate the nature of the relationship between the two.

Theory and Model
The model proposed in this study involves several specific variables of
analysis. The first element to be assessed is the nature of the international system.
Instead of assuming that states are socialized into an international system with a fixed
nature as do structural realists (Waltz 1979), the proposed model's conception of the
international system is one that changes and reformulates itself through time (Wendt
1999; Koslowski and Kradocwil 1994). Factors influencing change include
technological advances and evolving ideas of community (Kennedy 1987), and just as
the prevailing system affects the foreign policy of states, so may the actions of states
cause changes in the nature of the international system.
While structural realists may question the idea of an evolving international
system, scholars with other perspectives and from other social science fields have
acknowledged that the international system has changed over time and have
attempted to identify specific time periods in international relations. An example of
one such epoch in international relations is the period between the Napoleonic Wars
and the First World War, when the modem idea of the nation began to crystallize and
wars began to be fought between "peoples" instead of between "kings" (Palmer 1986:
119). During this time the nature of production, government, and warfare changed,
and the argument here is that this in tum changed the nature of the international
system which then acted as a force for change at the state level. Of course, assigning
3

a precise starting and ending point to such an era is a difficult task and is not likely to
be met with unanimous agreement. The main reason for disagreement is that history
can be conceived from a variety of viewpoints. Nevertheless, if historical evidence is
to yield any conclusions, this is a task in which social scientists must be engaged
(Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 331).
An important consideration related to the transformation of the international
system and its effect on states is the issue of how quickly states come to an
understanding of the transformation. Some states may adapt to a new environment
rapidly, while others are slower to perceive changes in the international system. This
is because the salience of events that bring about transformation in the international
environment may be felt less deeply in some societies than others, causing a time lag
before older ideas are updated to meet new realities. In other words, path dependency
may delay the adoption of a new worldview (Hausner, et al, 1995). Also, and
particularly relevant to this study, some states may be incapable of making foreign
policy decisions at certain times because of civil strife or domination by foreign
powers.
The second factor in foreign policy decision making to be assessed is the
political culture of the state involved. While many domestic political considerations
may have implications for foreign policy, such as bureaucratic politics (Allison 1971;
Destler 1972) public opinion (Russett and Graham 1989), interest group effects
(Dietrich 1999), media effects (Jakobsen 1995), and regime type (Mansfield and
Snyder 1995; Oneal, et al, 1996; Waltz 1967), this study will focus on political
culture and how it affects perception of situations. Political culture has been in and
4

out of vogue in the field of comparative politics over the last four decades, largely
because " ... the concept has been hard to pin down with any intellectual rigor, yet it is
also indispensable for serious thinking about the workings of human society and the
behavior of people" (Pye 2000:20). The primary problem for the political culture
approach has been its inability to explain societal change (Eckstein, 1988). This
handicap has rendered much of traditional cultural theory, which was developed by
cultural anthropology and held among its key assumptions that societal cultures are
" . . .logically consistent, highly integrated, consensual, resistant to change, and clearly
bounded . .. ," useless (Sewell, Jr., 1999: 55).
However, recent formulations of cultural theory have attempted to
accommodate and explain societal change. Swidler (1986) argues that a given society
possesses many cultural traits, any of which may be more salient in some situations
and less salient in others. What is important about her model is that it attempts to
explain how external events, such as a changing international environment, can
transform political culture. Similarly, Sahlins (1985) claims that culture is
" .. . historically reproduced in action" (p.vii). Drawing on the work of Clifford Geertz
(1973), who proposed that culture should be understood as system of symbols,
Sahlins articulates a concept of culture that is based on symbols which undergo
reinterpretation during periods of environmental change. In this way, cultural system
and cultural practice are linked (Sewell, Jr., 1999).
Culture plays an inherent part in any process or relationship. Therefore, there
are an infinite number of kinds of culture. This study addresses a specific dimension
of culture, how a society views its place in the world. A society's perception of its
5

position in the international arena reveals itself in the form of patterns that have
endured over many centuries. These patterns demonstrate that societies do possess
distinctive characteristics that affect the perceptions and actions of their members. Of
course, these patterns are abstract, and manifest themselves in varying ways
according to conditions during a particular period of history. Because the
international environment is not stable, a society is inevitably forced to change its
foreign policies, but the new policies are still conditioned by what has gone before.
This is the case, according to Michel Foucault, because "...it is part of the function of
memory and culture to be able to reactualize any objects whatever that have already
featured. Repetition is always possible; repetition with application, transformation"
(45).

A common example of this familiar to most Americans would be the idea of
the missionary mentality in American culture. Whereas Americans have always
believed that America should play a civilizing role in the world (Robertson 1980:
ch.3), the actual content of this civilizing message has changed over time. While in
the earlier times the content involved Christianity, today it is more likely to include
ideas about liberal economic policy and human rights standards that may or may not
be related to religion. Whereas the symbol, which in this case is the idea of the
civilizing mission, retains its power, the actions related to the symbol have been
transformed by the increasingly secular nature of the modern world.
This certainly does not mean that culture is the only or even the major variable
in foreign policy decision-making. In many cases the other variables such as the ones
referred to above, may be more important. However, culture does affect how facts
6

are interpreted and this means that the best way to assess how culture affects
decision-making is to analyze it in conjunction with other factors. The proposed
model in this study seeks to integrate the two concepts related above, the
transforming nature of the international system and a malleable conception of culture,
so that foreign policy may be more better analyzed. While related to earlier strategic
culture (Booth 1979) and national style studies (Terhune 1970; Holsti 1970), such a
model would provide an enhanced understanding of the adaptability of strategic
culture to the changing international environment.
What would corroborating evidence for such a model look like? The answer
that this study proposes is a specific pattern of decision making that exhibits itself
over time. Also important is a consideration of other factors that are believed to
affect decision making. By analyzing both culturally influenced patterns of decision
making and contending influences on decision making in competition, it is hoped that
at the very least a better understanding of cultural effects on foreign policy can be
gained. One way to do this is by examining specific decision opportunities within
the pattern. This requires an in depth consideration of the factors relevant in a
specific society at a certain point in time, thus marrying comparative politics and
international relations theory. Therefore, comparative case study is an appropriate
method for demonstrating how factors may operate differently in different societies.

Framework for Analysis
The framework that I am going to use to test my model is immediate extended
deterrence. The literature on immediate extended deterrence offers a useful
7

framework for examining and comparing decisions. Immediate extended deterrence
is a situation in which an attacker contemplates military action against another
country and a third party commits itself to the defense of the country threatened with
attack (Lebow and Stein 1988; Huth and Russett 1984; 1988). In other words,
immediate extended deterrence involves an instance in which country A agrees to
defend country B from an attack by country C. I will further elaborate on this
concept in the description of cases below. Immediate extended deterrence is
particularly useful because it presents a situation in which the attacking state must
make a choice of whether to go ahead with its plan of attack or back down. Also,
prior research has been undertaken to compile case lists for immediate extended
deterrence. These lists facilitate the task of selecting comparable cases for analysis.
Nevertheless, there is still room for differing interpretations of the
qualifications in the above definition. This has caused a considerable discrepancy in
the number of cases on each list. Whereas Huth and Russett identify sixty seven
cases of immediate extended deterrence between 1902 and 1988, Lebow and Stein,
applying a more conservative interpretation, find that only eleven cases in the Huth
and Russett list actually qualify as such (cited in Lebow and Stein, pp. 338-341).
Lebow and Stein give detailed examples of why several of Huth and Russett's cases
are problematic. These include the inability to ascertain commitment to attack,
inability to ascertain commitment to deterrence, and instances where compellence
(actually using military force as opposed to merely threatening military action) or
direct deterrence (a country deters a challenger from attacking itself instead of
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deterring the challenger from attacking a third party) are mistaken for cases of
immediate extended deterrence.
Because many of the cases in the Huth and Russett set are in doubt, immediate
extended deterrence is not amenable to large-n study without being vulnerable to
charges of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). While there have been attempts to
analyze deterrence quantitatively, these attempts have met with limited success (Levy
1989). Instead, a small-n study of cases is more appropriate so that the concept of
immediate extended deterrence can be better understood. While not being able to
develop grand theory, a study of this type is capable of generating partial
generalizations (Lijphart 1971). Moreover, the chosen method of analysis best
serves both the goals of better understanding foreign policy generally and immediate
extended deterrence specifically.

The Cases
Both of the cases I have chosen have been confirmed by both Huth and
Russett and Lebow and Stein. Nevertheless, because of problems found with cases in
both lists, this study will also attempt to independently confirm the cases. The cases
below were chosen for several reasons. First among these reasons is that the
decisions made in both cases do not conform to the rational model of decision
making. Second, the decisions in both cases do conform to a pattern of foreign policy
decision making during a specified era. Third, the patterns of decision making in
both cases stretch over a period lasting beyond the reign of any one leader, therefore
ruling out idiosyncratic decision making arguments.
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The cases are the Turkish decision to acquiesce to American pressure in 1964
and the Chinese decision to challenge Russian deterrence in defense of Vietnam in
1979. These and their qualifications will be briefly explained below in the following
manner. First, the general historical elements of the Turkish and Chinese cultures in
the form of patterns that have endured over many centuries will be introduced. Then,
I will discuss the foreign policy decisions of the Turkish and Chinese governments
during a specific era of decision-making, the First World War until the conclusion of
the Cold War, that conform to a more specific pattern. Finally, the specific
deterrence encounter decisions will be briefly analyzed. The characteristics that I
want to focus on are the Turkish desire for identification with civilization and the
Chinese need to demonstrate the greatness of their culture. Both of these cultural
traits have grown out of the historical and geographical characteristics unique to each
of these countries, and as related above, these traits have been illustrated in different
ways at different times.
Concerning Turkey, the specific contention here is that during the twentieth
century the Turkish search for civilization embodied itself in recurring attempts to
affiliate itself with Western international organizations. In earlier centuries the Turks
exhibited a tendency to attach themselves to other groups and live in community with
these groups. During their trek from Central Asia toward the Anatolian peninsula the
Turks encountered many groups and experimented with varoius cultures and
religions, making them perhaps the only ethnic group to practice all of the world's
major religions. Finally the Turks settled in Anatolia and adopted the Islamic faith.
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Where other communities were in the end deemed unacceptable by the Turks, the
strength of Islam and its monotheistic nature appealed to them.
The Turks were content to live as part of the Ottoman Empire along with the
Arabs and Persians as the Empire enjoyed centuries of success and expansion.
However, the rise of European power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
brought about a corresponding decline in Ottoman fortunes. In the wake of the First
World War the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Turks were once again without a
larger community with which to identify. Also, once again the Turks sought to join
the group of states that represented the dominant civilization of the day. Although the
Western Allies first sought to absorb and divide Turkey, the Turks fought to establish
a new republic and then attempted to become a member of the Western group of
states. This effort to adopt Western civilization was largely embodied in the
leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who became president of the Turkish Republic in 1922.
Under Kemal and his successors the Turks joined the League of Nations and
acted in accordance with League sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian crisis of
1935. While not actively participating in the Second World War, the Turks made a
formal declaration of war against Germany in early 1945, thereby gaining
membership in the fledgling United Nations. Following the war, Turkish attempts to
join the Western community increased. In 1950 the Turks sent troops to participate
in the UN police action in Korea. Shortly thereafter Turkey gained membership in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, realizing a long coveted goal. Throughout
the rest of the fifties and during the early sixties the Turks attempted to enter into
more multinational treaties with Western states, largely ignoring the interests of the
11

many newly independent nonwestern countries of which Turkey might possibly have
become the leader.
The Chinese record stands in strong contrast to that of the Turks, because the
Chinese have historically believed in the essential distinctiveness and superiority of
their culture. This is largely due to China's position as the largest and most central
country in East Asia. States surrounding China often adopted Chinese characters for
writing and imitated Chinese cultural and governmental practices, further contributing
to China's sense of superiority. Although China was militarily subdued and
conquered by the Mongols and the Manchurians, even this did little to humble the
Chinese because both of these groups attempted to become Chinese by compiling
imperial histories that included themselves among the Chinese dynasties.
This belief in the exceptional nature of Chinese culture went almost
completely unchallenged until the arrival of European powers in East Asia during the
early nineteenth century. The British victory over the Chinese in the Opium War of
1840-41 resulted in the Chinese granting concessions to the British including British
possession of Hong Kong. The Chinese felt that all of history was being repudiated,
and things were about to get worse. Other colonial powers, observing British success
in China, did not want to be left out. The French, Russians, Japanese, and others
would act to exploit China throughout the rest of the century. In the first half of the
twentieth century the Japanese would take on the role of major aggressor, demanding
much more than the other colonial powers and ultimately taking over most of Eastern
China. The Chinese response to foreign incursions was confused and divided. Only
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with the triumph of the Chinese Communists in 1949 did China begin to reassert its
position in the world.
Under the leadership of Mao Zedong the idea of Chinese superiority
reemerged in a new form. If the world did not acknowledge China's cultural
superiority, China would demonstrate its worthiness by never again backing down
from foreign challenges. In less than a year China was given the chance to back up
Mao's claims. The Chinese claimed that the American drive up the Korean peninsula
represented a threat to China and promptly entered the Korean War on the side of the
faltering North Koreans, fighting the Americans to a draw. China then confronted the
United States over the Taiwan issue in 1954 and 1958, invaded the border regions of
India in 1962, and fought skirmishes with the Soviets over disputed borders in 1969.
China had rediscovered its sense of superiority in a new form, military toughness.

Case #1, The Cyprus Crisis of 1964
The American attempt to deter a Turkish war against Greece over the Cyprus
issue in 1964 is the specific decision within the pattern to be analyzed and compared.
Although Russett and Huth identify Greece as the guardian state in this case,
historical accounts clearly show that the United States played a more significant role
in the effort to deter the Turkish invasion (Ball 1982: 350). Lebow and Stein do
identify the US as the guardian state and believe it to be the most impressive of the
three cases they identified as being successful immediate extended deterrence
encounters. The US attempt to deter a Turkish attack on Cyprus (which conventional
wisdom held would automatically trigger a war with Greece) came in the form of a
13

letter from President Johnson which declared that the United States would pull out of
Turkey and expose it to Soviet invasion should Turkey initiate war over Cyprus. This
communication, forever after simply known as the "Johnson letter," caused Turkish
president Inonu to immediately cancel invasion plans. This was done even though
the likelihood of Soviet attack was not imminent and the credibility of the American
threat was not strong. One student of Turkish foreign policy has even gone so far as
to term the Turkish fear of American abandonment a "nai"ve" decision (Celik 1999:
xiii). However, it was only a nai've decision if Turkey believed that the US would
really leave them unguarded in the face of a Soviet attack. Other concerns may have
caused Turkey to decide not to strike against Cyprus. I am suggesting that Turkey's
strong affiliation with NATO, a symbol of its affiliation with the West, was the
deciding factor in Inonu's decision. For while many in Turkey were angered by the
Johnson letter and angry at NATO, the Turkish government believed that leaving
NATO would " . . . slow Turkey down on her road toward the fundamental goal of
becoming an equal member of the Western society of nations" (Vali, 164).

Case #2, The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979
The second decision to be analyzed is the unsuccessful Soviet attempt to deter
the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Both Russett and Huth, and Lebow and
Stein locate this case in the category of unsuccessful immediate extended deterrence.
Like the American attempt to deter Turkish action against Cyprus, it involves a
superpower playing the role of guardian state. During the late 1970s the Soviet
Union and Vietnam began to establish friendlier ties in what was already a close
14

relationship. As Vietnam successfully invaded its western neighbors in Indochina,
Laos and Cambodia (who received Chinese support), China began to feel that it was
being encircled. The Chinese began to make noises about invading Vietnam, and the
Russians and Vietnamese signed a Treaty of Friendship. The treaty did not stipulate
definite Soviet intervention if Vietnamese borders were violated, but Soviet Premier
Brezhnev did make it clear that this was a possibility that China must keep in mind
(Gilks 1992: 218). According to simple power calculations, if Turkey gave in to
American threats of removing NATO protection, China would definitely yield to a
much more powerful contiguous state that could easily invade Chinese territory. Yet
this was not the case. Conceivably, China had much more to lose than Turkey did for
going its own way, but prior patterns of Chinese action led China to act in a contrary
manner. This happened even though the Soviet nuclear force was vastly superior to
the Chinese nuclear force and the fact that Soviet intervention would cause a two
front war. Instead .of heeding the possibility of a Soviet response, Deng Xiaoping
followed the Maoist procedure of striking at an enemy to demonstrate that China
would not be cowed and bullied as it had been before 1949. Chinese foreign policy
called for a much different way of dealing with stronger states than did the precepts
of Ataturk to which the Turks adhered. As with the Turkish case, however, I will
demonstrate that China's unique perceptions about itself and its place in the world led
to the decision to undertake punitive action against Vietnam.
Both cases fall into the period between the First World War and the end of the
Cold War, and it is the nature of this era that I will analyze for its effects on the
cultures and foreign policy decisions of China and Turkey. This historical delineation
15

is borrowed from Huntington, who suggests that during this period " . . . the conflict of
nation states was supplemented by the conflict of ideologies, first among fascism,
communism, and liberal democracy, and then between the latter two" (1996:52), and
also Morgenthau, who finds that international relations after the First World War was
characterized by a completely different moral climate than before the war (1963:
259). There is little argument that the First World War was a watershed event in
international relations (Miller 1994: 44). This study will show that the characteristics
of that war and their effects on the international system initiated and sustained an
environment that can be differentiated from other periods of history, and that these
characteristics had a marked impact on culture and foreign policy decision making.

Implications
The implications of this study fall into three broad categories. First, as has
already been suggested, this study can provide a model for overcoming the division
between nomothetic and ideographic studies. Also, the model provides possible
solutions to some of international relations theory's current problems regarding
change and prediction. It does this by offering a way to integrate the cultural
perspectives of specific states with the prevailing social characteristics of the
international system. While there have been many calls for theory in both
international relations and foreign policy studies to accommodate perceptual factors
(Alker 1992; Haas 1997; Weber 1995), not many concrete proposals of models that
would actually do this have been put forward. This model is one that could be
employed for understanding and also predicting foreign policies of specific states.
16

The third implication of this study is that area and actor specific information is
important and useful for the practice of foreign policy. While many international
relations scholars have neglected the importance of area specific information, foreign
policy practitioners disagree and disregard much of grand international relations
theory because of the lack of emphasis on area specific factors (George 1993: 130).
By creating a model that heavily relies on actor specific information, it is hoped that
foreign policy studies can be made more useful for foreign policy practitioners. More
specifically, this study contributes to the general understanding of immediate
extended deterrence and in what cases it will be effective. The immediate extended
deterrence studies noted above (Huth and Russett, 1984; 1988; Lebow and Stein,
1988) focus on the actions and outlook of the defending party, not the attacking party.
This study focuses solely on the perceptions of the attacking party. This is important
for those practicing immediate extended deterrence (the defending party) because the
effectiveness of a particular deterrence strategy is dependent on the intentions of the
adversary against whom the strategy is undertaken (Axelrod 1984: 30). Without a
particular understanding of how a potential adversary is interpreting the deterring
signals it sends, a defending state is more likely to fail in its efforts to deter an attack
on a friendly third party.
This is particularly relevant to decision making in American foreign policy
because of the US role as global superpower. Although foreign policy issues such as
terrorism are increasingly important, much of American foreign policy involves
preventing or moderating conflict in various regions of the world. As different crises
arise, an enhanced understanding of a specific country's foreign policy orientation
17

may aid US officials in deciding which threats are more serious than others and
whether diplomatic initiatives are likely to be successful or not.

Outline of the Study
The first chapter includes an introduction to cultural theories, immediate
extended deterrence, methodology, and the cases to be considered. Both the second
and third chapters deal with theoretical issues. The second chapter explains the type
of cultural theory employed here. Issues such as the validity of cultural theory, the
origins of cultures, and the ability of cultures to adapt to changing circumstances are
addressed as well as several studies employing recent forms of cultural theory (Hunt
1984; Sahlins 1985, 198 1). The third chapter justifies and explains the delineation of
historical eras of international relations. The types of changes that transform the
international system will be discussed, as will characteristics that are specific to
different eras of international relations. Special emphasis is given to justifying the
uniqueness of the period relevant to the cases in this study, which began with the
coming of the First World War and ended with the conclusion of the Cold War. The
characteristics of this period that are the most salient for the purposes of this study are
the prevalence of international organizations, which gave the Turks a means for
identifying with Western civilization, and the escalated violence during the twentieth
century, which influenced Chinese methods of demonstrating Chinese greatness.
The fourth and fifth chapters discuss the historical patterns in Turkish and
Chinese foreign policy and the factors relevant to each. These will expand on the
information provided above about Turkish and Chinese culture and decision-making.
18

Chapter Four considers the Turkish proclivity to submerge its foreign policy within
Western international organizations during the time from the establishment of the
Turkish Republic until the end of the Cold War within the context Turkish culture.
Chapter Five considers the Chinese pattern of undertaking pre-emptive strikes
against prospective enemies during the years between the establishment of the
People's Republic and the demise of the Soviet Union within the context of Chinese
culture. Chapter Six provides a focused comparison of the Turkish decision to
acquiesce to American demands that it not invade Cyprus in 1964 and the Chinese
decision to rebuff Russian attempts to deter the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1 979.
Chapter Seven will draw general conclusions from the earlier chapters, suggest
possibilities related to Turkish and Chinese foreign policy, and state the implications
of the study for general social science theory, international relations theory, and the
practice of foreign policy.
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CHAPTER II
NEW CULTURAL THEORY
AND FOREIGN POLICY

The viability of culture as a factor in decision-making and political outcomes
has been the subject of much discussion and debate both inside and outside political
science. Political commentators often claim that leaders make certain decisions
because of cultural influences without explaining what they mean by culture. A small
minority of social scientists simply reject the idea that culture affects behavior, while
many others who adhere to the precepts of behavioralism believe that culture is a
factor affecting action but that it should not be studied because it cannot be
adequately measured (Easton 1967). Others have attempted to demonstrate that
culture is an important variable in explaining political outcomes, and they have done
so with varying degrees of success.
Several important political culture studies include Almond and Verba (1963),
Inglehart (197 1), and Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990). Al�ond and Verba's
analysis of political culture in five different countries and development of a typology
regarding national political participation was a significant contribution to the
literature in comparative politics in that it was the first large systematic study of
political culture. Although this study was similar to the present study in that it drew
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on theories from sociology and anthropology, it did not, as this study does, concern
itself with how culture affects foreign policy. Also, the fact that the authors did not
survey members of the lower class or women of any class in the five countries in
question considerably weakened the viability of the study (Almond and Verba 1989).
Inglehart makes an important contribution in that he demonstrates how
changes in the industrial and economic environment within a national society over
time affect the perspectives of different generations. His introduction of the concept
of post materialism indicates very well the idea that changing circumstances can
translate into changing values. However, he does not adequately explain how older
forms of culture affected the more recent forms. The weakness of his work is
summed up in Giddens' statement that, ''The current importance of discontinuist
conceptions in social science and philosophy should not be allowed to obliterate the
continuities that make discontinuity possible" (1979: 216).
Rather than viewing culture from a national perspective, Ellis, Thompson,
and Wildavsky maintain that culture can be better understood by viewing individuals
as being members of one of four groups: individualists, hierarchs, egalitarians, or
fatalists. They argue that all of these groups can be found in every country. No
explanation of the importance of the cultural filters associated with national or ethnic
groups is given. The central problem of this study is very different from the major
shortcoming of Inglehart ( 1 971 ). Whereas Inglehart did not seek to account for past
influences on culture because of his overemphasis on cultural change, Ellis,
Thompson, and Wildavsky assume that culture completely determines the formation
of preferences and does not change (Ellis 1993: 1 75).
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The present study is different from those mentioned above in both its area of
analysis and its theoretical premise. As already related, this study is concerned with
cultural effects on foreign policy, not political participation or public opinion on
domestic issues. Nevertheless, the theory employed here attempts to overcome some
of the problems mentioned above. Instead of ignoring the past as does Inglehart or
being hopelessly bound to the past as do Ellis, Thompson and Wildavsky' s cultural
groups, the theory employed here gives adequate consideration to both tradition and
innovation. This will be discussed in later sections of this chapter. What
immediately follows is a basic discussion of why humans have culture and how it
affects understanding.
This study claims that culture is an important factor in political outcomes
because culture is the element that holds definable groups of individuals together.
Because individuals work collectively to tame the environment, whether it be natural
or social, in which they live, those within a cultural group feel bonded to one another
through a common perception of their environment. Culture necessarily entails a
common general understanding and outlook on life. This idea is summed up in the
statement that, " . . . there is a common core to learning how a society works, knowing
how it works, and knowing how to change it. Central to all these is the fact that
people are social, that they exist and act in relation to each other" (Carrithers, 20).
Culture, then, is the system that humans use to operate in their environment
(Triandis, 15). Humans begin to attain culture and understandings of the world
colored by culture very early in life. This due to the fact that all humans have the
inborn capacity to become cultural (Trevarthen 1983), and also that for infants the
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salient feature of their environment is other human beings (Carrithers, 57). The social
world predominates from the first moment of consciousness. In other words, all
humans begin life using socially constructed culture as a means for making sense out
of their environments and continue to do so throughout their lives. Reality certainly
exists, but it can never be perfectly understood by humans because they rely on
cultural filters to understand reality (Charon, 6).
Culture serves as a medium for organizing knowledge and experience. It
provides the ability to categorize and discriminate. However, what culture cannot do
is distinguish fact from myth (Mantovani, 2). This is why individuals from different
cultures may have a difficult time communicating and arriving at common
understanding on particular issues. The different histories that individuals from
different cultures have experienced have imposed meanings on those individuals that
makes complete cross-cultural understanding impossible. These differences are
described in the statement that:

Culture may be reflected in general tendencies of persistent preference
for particular states of affairs over others, persistent preferences for
specific social processes over others, and general rules for selective
attention, interpretation of environmental cues, and responses. It is
generally known that culture may provide detailed prescriptions
(norms) for specific classes of situations while leaving other domains
relatively unregulated. National and ethnic cultures are thus dis
tinguished in their degree of regulation of behavior, attitudes, and
values, the domain of regulation, and the consistency and clarity of
regulation and tolerance of other cultures (Tse, et al. 1988: 82).
Symbols
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Symbols are a major component of culture because they are the means by
which humans learn about and attain culture (Charon, 62). Symbols provide for
common understanding by enabling people to understand themselves, each other, and
the world around them (Geertz, 250). For the purposes of this study, a symbol may
be defined as " . . . any structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal
meaning designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and
figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first" (Riceour 1974: 1213). Symbols, then, retain and expand their meaning through their flexibility.
Instead of losing their meaning when new circumstances arise, symbols undergo a
process of reinterpretation.
Symbols are a particularly important factor in maintaining national unity and
identity over time. Only through symbols can citizens feel an attachment to one
another and to the common past from which they have emerged. As the world
changes national societies must change with it, but they must also retain some sense
of what has gone before so as to preserve their distinctiveness and unity. Flexible
symbols make this combination of transformation and continuity possible. They
allow for confidence in the future of societies because they are:
. . . the guiding stars of the timely existence of groups that facilitate for
the group the stabilization under the sign of self-identity. A group feels
itself strongly embedded in the world if it can trace its creation back into
history and if really traditional and ancient movements can be coded into
its symbols. Consequently we are faced with mythic devices which are
considerably transformed under modem conditions (Csepeli, 69).
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These symbols take many forms. Obvious examples include national flags or
anthems. More subtle forms include ideas, values, goals, and rules (Charon, 62). All
of these are expressed in words and language, which are also symbolic.

New Cultural Theory
New cultural theory maintains that symbols and their interpretation are the
essence of culture and that symbols are the only continuous element of culture. New
cultural theory certainly makes allowance for the transformation of culture over time,
but it argues that all changes are based upon some level of constancy. As events
occur the context of action is changed, but some residue remains that affects what
will happen in the future. Because symbols are flexible and may undergo
reinterpretation, they simultaneously enable modified understandings and constrain
the number of forms these understandings may take.
New cultural theory seeks to overcome many of the traditional divisions
within social science, attempting to show that the dichotomy between what Geertz
(1973: 251) refers to as "epochalism" and "essentialism," or what might otherwise be
referred to as history and anthropology, may not be justified. New cultural theory
also looks to bridge the gap between nomothetic and ideographic research.
Nomothetic science is based on three assumptions. (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 57) First, social science is capable of producing general statements by means of
finding general patterns. Also, scientific theory should employ deductive logic.
Finally, causal relationships can be derived by discovering spatio-temporal
relationships between events. Ideographic research, by contrast, isolates a concrete
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unit of analysis and asserts that the internal dialectic of this unit is unique and cannot
be found elsewhere (Galtung, 108). Because the premise of new cultural theory is
that more general phenomena can only be interpreted through a local perspective,
new cultural theory provides the possibility of overcoming the opposition between
nomographic and ideographic research.
Describing the role of those scholars who use the new cultural approach,
Richard Biernacki writes that, ". . . cultural analysts define the pragmatic contexts
which symbols are employed for sake of revealing governing patterns that utilitarian
manipulation or principals or adaptation to the environment do not readily explain"
(69-70). Only by understanding social context can we understand what events mean
in a particular society and why actions in that society take the form that they do. This
does not mean that all action is irrational, only that all action has some basis in
previous understanding (Foucault, 37). This implies that not only does past action
modify understanding and affect present action, but also that present action will serve
to modify action in the future. Cultural concepts accumulate meaning as they are
used as guides to action over time.
New cultural theorists serve to remedy one of the key problems in social
science, the inability to account for how the past affects the present. No matter how
fast a society undergoes change, change is still conditioned by the past. Rather than
deprecating the role of the past, those wanting to understand social change must
realize that only by first understanding what is continuous in society can social
change be understood at all (Giddens, 7).
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New cultural theory stems from Saussure's studies of structuralism and
language. Structuralism is the defining characteristic of " . . . theoretical perspectives
which give primacy to pattern over substance. For a structuralist, meaning comes
through knowing how things fit together, not from understanding things in isolation"
(Barnard, 120). Saussure believed that the nature of language could only be
understood by viewing how it was modified over time. Concerning language and
change, he wrote, "What predominates in all change is the persistence of the old
substance; disregard for the past is only relative. That is why the principle of change
is based upon the principle of continuity" (Saussure, 74).
All humans have the natural ability to learn and use language, but the learning
of any particular language entails taking on a specific cultural outlook (Jahoda, 5).
Existing language is constantly used to classify new concepts. In this way
individuals' understanding of new developments in their environment is strongly
influenced by the verbal categorizations that were previously in place (Leach, 33).
The power of language to constrain understanding reflects the power of the social
world to make meanings for individuals within that social world.
Closely related to Saussure's study of language is Ricoeur's ( 1 974) study of
the metaphorical quality of words. He claims that words have the characteristic of
polysemy, meaning that words have the capability to take on new meanings without
discarding older meanings. However, the number of meanings a word can acquire is
not boundless because new meanings must find their place within the system of
already existing meanings, thereby limiting the number and type of new meanings a
word can attain. Describing the relation of words to events and the process that
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brings them together, Ricoeur writes that, "In rising from system to event, in the
instance of discourse, it brings structure to the act of speech. In returning from event
to the system, it brings to the system the contingency and disequilibrium without
which it could neither change or endure; in short, it gives a 'tradition' to the
structure, which, in itself, is outside of time"(95).
Just as language systems and words simultaneously alter and endure, so do
ways of thinking. Bourdieu's ( 1990) concept of the habitus illustrates how systems
of thinking evolve. The habitus is a system for structuring experience that provides
guidelines for organizing and comprehending information but do not necessarily
provide reliable solutions to problems because of the limits of any structured system.
The habitus is produced by shared perspectives of history and produces history for
both individuals and societies at large. This is because the habitus is carried by each
individual in the form of perceptual schemes that work to produce "correct" behaviors
(1990: 54), behaviors that conform to social expectations within a specific entity.
The habitus is a constant force, and in part because of this it is hard to
recognize. Things that change are easily noticed while those that remain constant
may well be taken for granted. Social action is inexplicable from a purely rationalist
perspective. Those who try to understand the world from a rational perspective will
only account for immediate environmental changes and factors and as a result, be left
wanting in their explanations. Only by comprehending both the habitus and
environmental changes can social action be understood and appreciated. The habitus
allows the mind to freely generate understanding within its constraints. It is similar
to the mind of a developed artist who has spent years learning established methods
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but then discovers a new form or style in that it takes what is already known and
attempts to use this knowledge to interpret new developments (1990: 55). This does
not imply that the habitus can account for everything, and information which directly
rejects the thrust of a particular habitus is likely to be rejected by those who employ
this habitus to understand the world.
Because language, words, and the concept of the habitus are all related to and
compose the symbols that give societies the ability to communicate and retain
collective identity, they may affect political developments within a society or between
societies considerably. This is the basic principle of new cultural theory. Two
accounts of new cultural theory research are discussed in the following paragraphs,
with particular emphasis on the second one as it is more closely related to the present
study.
Regarding domestic politics, Hunt (1984) demonstrates the ways in which
symbols were appropriated by different groups during the French Revolution. The
revolutionaries eventually adopted the female figure of Marianne on the seal of the
republic in part because of her resemblance to the Virgin Mary, a historically familiar
figure in Catholic France (1984: 93). While an opposing group of revolutionaries
unsuccessfully attempted to put Hercules on the seal, in later decades socialist groups
used a similar figure to represent the model worker (1984: 1 1 5). Both Marianne and
Hercules gained legitimacy as symbols because of their ties to earlier symbols. As
this study is more concerned with national identity and how it is transformed by the
outside world, we now tum to an account of how influences from the outside world
are interpreted by those within a state.
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One of the key works in the field of new cultural theory is Marshal Sahlins'
Islands of History ( 1985). In his account of Hawaiian culture and the Cook landing in
Hawaii, Sahlins demonstrates how Hawaiians " . . . put their concepts and categories
into ostensible relations to the world"(1985: 149). Hawaii was like many other
traditional societies, in that inevitably the Europeans came, but could only be
understood by the Hawaiians as playing a part in their own indigenous legends.
Hawaiians and their culture were subjected to interference from the outside world that
could only be interpreted within existing cultural categories and yet also transformed
those categories. What follows is a description of a Hawaiian cultural myth and the
part that Cook and his men played in making this myth come to life.
The Hawaiians traditionally celebrated the winter solstice with the New Year
Festival of Lono, a god who returned every year during the period when the days
began to get longer. During this period, known to the Hawaiians as the Makahiki,
Lono came to the islands to retrieve his estranged wife who had since been captured
by and married to the local king. As Lono arrived on the beach with his warriors,
Hawaiian women would attempt to arouse Lono and the warriors by doing a
seductive dance. (This was indeed the famous "hula" dance.)
During the first fifteen days of the Makahiki, Lono symbolically takes control
of the island districts one by one, setting the stage for a confrontation with the king on
the sixteenth day of the Makahiki. On the morning of the sixteenth day Lono returns
to the beach with his warriors and a mock battle ensues in which the king first suffers
a mock death, but then returns from the dead to defeat Lono who is sacrificed a few
days later. After the sacrifice the body of Lono is put on a raft and set out to sea.
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According to Sahlins the situation was one in which:
the dynastic heroes, initially male and stranger-invaders, are neutralized
and 'feminized' by the indigenous people. In the process, the people,
originally the female reproductive cum earthly powers, are themselves
transformed into a peripheral and protective masculine force. The
transformations are mediated by the surrender of a native princess to
the immigrant prince, which is alternatively the stranger's fructifying
marriage to the earth, hence the neutralization of his dynastic as the
female descent of the native people (1990: xv).
During January 1 778, the time of the Makahiki, Captain Cook and his sailors
and marines landed in Hawaii and disembarked from their two ships, the Resolution
and Discovery. From the Hawaiian point of view it could only be Lono and his
warriors coming from ocean. The women came to seduce Cooks' crew, and while
Cook forbade his men to take up relations with the Hawaiian women, this order was,
perhaps not surprisingly, disobeyed. Cook and his men stayed for a short period and
received much hospitality from the Hawaiians with Cook himself being given all of
the homage due Lono. Because they left before the Makahiki concluded, Cook and
his men escaped the possible confrontation that awaited Lono at the close of the
Makahiki.
In November 1778 Cook returned to the Hawaiian islands. As he was arriving
near the time of the Makahiki, the islanders again saw in Cook's return the coming of
Lono. During this second stay in the islands, Cook realized the futility of his order
concerning relations between the crew and Hawaiian women. While sexual relations
between the crew and Hawaiian women were certainly not taboo as far as Hawaiian
chiefs were concerned, other forms of contact between the two groups, such as eating
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together, were a violation. The European men of the crew began to treat the women
in ways that seemed completely normal to them, asking them to stay on the ship and
having meals together. From the Hawaiian point of view this served to humanize the
Europeans, making them seen all the more to be the warriors of Lono who lost their
status as deities over the course of the Makahiki .
Cook and his crew stayed in the islands until February 3, 1779.

Having

already overstayed the time of the Makahiki , prior to Cook's departure the Hawaiians
had begun an anxious line of questioning on the subject of when Cook would leave.
When he and his ships did go, the Hawaiians were assured that the festival had
reached its resolution. The fact that Cook was again departing was interpreted as the
sacrifice of Lono. It seemed that the possibility of a real battle between the
Europeans and the Hawaiians, the gods and the humans, had been eliminated.
Tragically, in a little more than a week Cook was forced to return to the
islands. The foremast of the Resolution was damaged in a gale on February 1 1 , and it
and the Discovery made for Hawaii in order to repair the ship. The British sensed the
uneasiness on the part of the Hawaiians but assumed that the Hawaiian chiefs and
king would understand the mast problem. This hope was in vain. The Hawaiians
believed that instead of submitting to defeat, Lono was now returning to replace the
king. As Cook and his men reached the beach the islanders and their king met the
Europeans in battle and Cook was fatally wounded.
Cook's death fulfilled the Hawaiian's expectations, yet also forced them to
evolve. After his death he and other Englishmen were identified with the Hawaiian
gods. The Hawaiian kings became concerned with the behavior and customs of the
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British royal family. When British sailors came to Hawaii , King Kamehamea asked
them if he lived like George III. Sahlins characterizes this cultural evolution as a
situation where: "By encompassing contingent events in received structures,
perceiving mythical relationships in historical actions, the system appears merely to
reproduce itself in a flexible way" (1985: 3 1).
While the episode of Captain Cook and the Hawaiians is a very specific and
dramatic account, something like this happens in all societies periodically. Every
society has to confront new circumstances that are imposed on it from the outside
world. Any given society can only react to these new circumstances by using its
already developed categories of understanding. This reaction to outside influence
will both maintain and change the cultural categories of understanding that are put
into action. Also, whatever action is taken will also serve to change the general
situation in the outside world. In other words, culture and circumstance continually
cascade off one another. Both culture and circumstance are dependent variables
causing ". . . the devolution of the global forces to the terms of local action and
conversely the expansion of local actions to global significance. It is thus half true
that the event is a unique realization of a general structure. The other half is the
realization of the unique event as a new general order" (Sahlins 199 1 :81).

Foreign Policy Studies
The study of foreign policy is a relatively open subfield of study in that it
borrows from and forms links between other disciplines. It has always drawn on
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related fields, including international relations theory, theories of organization,
psychological studies, and history, to name a few (Wright 1955). Also, many
different influences foreign policy decision-making have been investigated. There
has been strong interest in how organizational structures affect policy outputs.
Allison (1971) demonstrated that it was difficult for the Kennedy administration to
arrive at a rational solution during the Cuban Missile Crisis because of standing
. bureaucratic processes and routines. Destler (1972) found that different American
presidential administrations rely on different government departments for foreign
policy advice because presidential confidence in individuals (not a specific
department, such as state or defense) is the determining factor concerning whom the
president consults while making a foreign policy decision.
Another important focus of attention has been regime type. Oneal et al.
(1996) argues that the combination of democratic government and liberal economic
policies foster international economic interdependence, thus constraining leader's
options related to the use of force in international disputes. Mansfield and Snyder
( 1 995), however find that while mature democratic governments are unlikely to

initiate wars, states making the transition to democracy may be more likely to go to
war than stable authoritarian governments. They believe that the extension of
political power to masses of people who have scant democratic experience may mean
that leaders are less capable of opting for peaceful solutions in international disputes.
Related to these studies are those that examine the effect of public opinion and
the media on foreign policy decision-making in democracies. Russett and Graham
(1989) find that public opinion is not as volatile as was once believed and that public
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opinion increasingly constrains presidential decision-making. In a somewhat
contradictory finding, Dietrich ( 1999) finds that interest groups only influence foreign
policy decisions in minor ways. Concerning the media, Jakobsen ( 1995) argues that
media encouraged foreign policy undertakings such as the Somalia operation are rare
and that the national interest is still the overriding consideration of decision-makers.
Attention has also been given to psychological and sociological factors and
how they affect foreign policy decision-making. With regard to cognition, Herek
( 1986) addresses the phenomena of leaders' interpreting information in ways that
confirm previously held beliefs. M. Hermann ( 1979) analyzes the effects of stress on
foreign policy decision makers. Janis ( 1982) finds that decision groups composed of
people with similar opinions and social backgrounds may make less than optimal
decisions due to an inability to search for alternative solutions. However, while
foreign policy theorists have been happy to borrow from the schools of thinking and
have analyzed the factors mentioned above and their influence on foreign policy
decision-making, they have been somewhat reluctant to use cultural theories or focus
on cultural aspects of foreign policy decisions (Hudson, 6).
This is unfortunate because there is a strong case to be made for a relationship
between culture and foreign policy. The few scholars who have undertaken the study
of national style make this point. National style " . . . may be understood as a nation's
basic assumptions and beliefs about the world and its own role or place in it ... It
affects perception, judgment, and modes of behavior on the international plane"
(Krakau, 255). This means that each nation-state views the world differently based
on its past experiences. Similar to the idea of national style yet more specific is the
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notion of strategic culture. Strategic culture refers to the idea that each state operates
on the world scene in a unique way do to factors unique to that specific state. Instead
of making the best choice when a decision opportunity arises as strict rational choice
theorists assume, the leaders of a given state will make a less than optimal decision
due to a "historically imposed inertia" that colors their perception of facts (Johnston,
34). National style and strategic culture can both be understood as being in keeping
with the idea of limited rationality in that each argues that decisions are made from an
incomplete perspective.
The concept of limited rationality was certainly integral to the Sprouts' (1965)
study of foreign policy and decision-making. Concerning decision making, the
Sprout's introduced the idea of the decision maker's "psycho-milieu," which consists
of " .. . images or ideas, derived from some sort of interaction between what he
selectively receives from his milieu (via his sensory apparatus) and his scheme of
values, conscious memories, and subconsciously stored experience"(l 965: 28). This
definition makes it plain that the world in which the decision maker lives can never
be comprehended in its totality but instead is instead viewed imperfectly because
vision is restricted by experience. The psycho-milieu, however, is an individual
concept. It does not suggest to what extent national cultural attributes are part of
leaders' environments and to what extent they affect leaders' abilities and outlooks
when making decisions.
Other important studies of foreign policy decision-making, while not
providing detailed accounts of how domestic cultural factors affect decision-making
have pointed to the importance of these factors. Jervis (1976) claims that decision36

makers are influenced by predispositions that are a product of their national societal
perceptions (1976: 283). In their discussion of the setting for foreign policy decision
making, Snyder, Bruck and Sabin (1962) include the political attitudes of the
population as an important determinant (1962: 68). George (1985) argues that all
organizations " . . . assimilate incoming information to preexisting images, beliefs,
hypotheses, theories . . . " (1985: 497).
In their latest consideration of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison and Zelikow
(1999), refer to the importance of national outlooks. While Allison and Zelikow are
principally concerned with the relative strengths and weaknesses of the rational actor
model, the organizational behavior model, and the governmental politics model, they
also state that state level factors are important. In discussing the bounded nature of
rational decision making, they claim that national attitudes are an important factor
effecting decision-making, and that these attitudes will change over time. They state
that if one were ". . . ignorant.. .of the differences between American national attitudes
in the late 1990s and the mid- l 960s, or between the mid-l 960s and those of the mid
l 930s, fundamental factors in shaping the foreign policy of the United States would
be overlooked" (1999: 390). Although this indicates that Allison and Zelikow believe
that national attitudes change more frequently than the present study supposes, the
more important point is that they believe that national attitudes constrain foreign
policy decision-making and that these attitudes are apt to change. Allison and
Zelikow, however, do not comment on the sources of national attitudes nor the
reasons why they change.
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This study contends that national cultural attributes are a significant portion
of leaders' environments and affect leaders' perspectives considerably. This is
because the nation state is prominent in framing the way all citizens understand the
world outside of it. According to Vertzberger:

Societal attributes affect the nation' s image of self and other actors in
the international system. They act as guiding constraints on what
policymakers perceive as possible, accountable, and legitimate range
of interpretations and judgements. The attributes, which are formed
in a process of socialization that policymakers are exposed to in the
various stages of their life cycle and career, exist as generic frames of
reference stored in memory and easily retrievable. They are well
anchored, sometimes being unchallengeable and even unchangeable.
Significant deviations from these collectively shared conceptual
frames of reference may be penalized in democratic regimes through
the electoral process or in nondemocratic regimes by the decline of
public support for policies and possibly by the loss of power
( 1990: 261).
While there will certainly be varied opinions within a state concerning the correct
foreign policy of that state, there will also be a general understanding held by a
majority of citizen's concerning that state's place in the world. Being a member of
any particular national society entails the development of an us and them mentality,
even among allies.
A nation-state's perceived place in the world, also known as its
national identity, is directly linked to the way its citizens perceive the outside world.
It " . .. can hardly be imagined without the feelings of trauma and pride that arise from
external relations" (Dijkink, 11). National sentiments are rooted both in history and
geography and the combination between the two (Lowenthal, 15). Ethnic or political
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groups that remain intact over long periods of time can only survive by passing down
stories and myths that give a community definition (Smith 1986: 208). The
nationalism of many modem nation states cannot be understood without reference to
the historical ties that it has which may extend back into antiquity (Smith 1999: 40).
While the physical aspects of a state's geography may affect national identification to
some extent, what is more important is the emotional attachment to places that the
members of a society develop over time (Dijkink, 15). The violent conflicts of the
past decade, in the former Yugoslavia and in Palestine in particular, have been a
testament to this truth. The details of history and geography inform the foreign policy
perspectives of the citizens living in a particular state. Perspective constrains action,
and only by having knowledge about cultural perspectives can we understand why
states act as they do.

Foreign Policy and New Cultural Theory
It is the purpose of this study to demonstrate that new cultural theory
represents an important means for understanding foreign policy. While Sahlins'
account of Cook and the Hawaiians is certainly related to foreign policy, as far as this
author knows no specific study of foreign policy utilizing new cultural theory has
been undertaken at the time of this writing. Earlier studies of national style have
suggested that anthropological theory is a useful tool for comprehending the way a
specific country sees the world and its role in it (Brown and Itzkowitz, 161). A more
recent study of national style discusses the possibilities for using newer theories for
understanding foreign policy and finds that, "Potentially more promising would
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appear to be the marriage of traditional foreign policy analysis to recent work in
cultural anthropology" (Krakau, 255). That is exactly what this study intends to do.
By showing how certain circumstances and norms began to dominate
international politics during certain eras, this study will use new cultural theory to
explain foreign policy outcomes. Instead of examining specific sets of
circumstances' effects on specific societies, this study argues that by the early
twentieth century a uniform international system that imposed similar constraints on
all states had come into existence. It is the objective of the following chapter to
explain the nature of the evolution of the international system and why specific
features of the system were more important during certain eras.
Undoubtedly factors such as the military and economic capabilities of a given
state are important in comprehending that state's foreign policy. However, these
factors are insufficient for explaining why states act the way they do in the
international arena. This is because no state can assess its capabilities without
viewing them through that state's cultural filter. Only by understanding the
characteristics of a specific state's role in the world in tandem with the details of the
global social environment of the time that form this cultural filter can foreign policy
actions be completely understood.
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CHAPTER III
THE GLOBAL AND IDEOLOGICAL NATURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY

The preceding chapter dealt with the idea of societal cultures and the impact
that perspectives derived from these cultures had on the way that societies reacted to
events. This chapter is concerned with the environment within which national
societies operate, the international system. The main contention of this chapter is that
the international system, at least by the early part of the twentieth century, had
evolved beyond any specific European context and had become a generalized system
which imposed conditions upon all of the world's states. While states approached
their affairs with other states from unique perspectives, all states operated within a
common environment that imposed constraints on state actions. Furthermore, this
environment was not and is not permanent but is apt to change over time.
During the twentieth century international relations were characterized by
ideological conflict due to the influence of organizational and technological
improvement just prior to and during the twentieth century. Following the Cold War
ideology lost some of its global salience, and while it may be too early to understand
the defining characteristic of the present era of international relations, it is not likely
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to be a repetition of the twentieth century. Different periods of international history
will have different characteristics that impose different constraints and offer different
opportunities to states.
While international relations scholars may disagree on the nature of
international system, there is general agreement that the international system is a
factor affecting the foreign policy of states. Traditional realists believe that the
structure of the international system is necessary but not always sufficient in
explaining most aspects of international relations (Kegley 1995: chapter 2).
Neorealists, sometimes labeled structural realists, do not believe that the structure of
the internationa_l system allows for prediction of specific foreign policy behavior but
strongly assert that system is the salient constraint affecting the actions of states
(Waltz 1997, 1995). Liberal international theorists (neoliberal institutionalists) find
that the international system offers opportunities for cooperation and that
international relations are going through a process of transformation due to political
and economic modernization (Zacher and Matthew 1995: 108).
While neorealists claim that the international system is an unchanging
environment in which power is the only important characteristic (Waltz, 1979), this
argument needs to be questioned. This is because:
To reduce all international politics. . . to a 'struggle for power' is
to beg as many questions as to provide answers for them.
Developments in technology, economic processes, the expansion
of the international system and the changing character of the
state may have significant consequences on the structures and
processes of international politics (K. Holsti, 5).
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Although political scientists have not demonstrated a widespread interest in
dividing international relations into specific periods (Buzan and Little 2000), there
have been some significant efforts in this area. Rosecrance (1963) argues that nine
chronologically separate international systems existed during the time from the
beginning of the eighteenth century through World War II He explains that each of
these systems was marked by a different kind of diplomatic style (1963: 5). Luard
( 1976), in a study that makes demarcations of international history similar to this
study, argues that the international system experienced transformation in 1648, 1789,
and 1914 and that these periods were dominated by different ideologies. In his
description of the international social dynamic that dominated the era from World
War I until the time of his writing, Luard states that:

. . . domestic societies were preoccupied by concern over different
political ideologies. These rivalries and differences were reflected
in somewhat comparable rivalries and differences between states
within the international society as a whole. So the concern with
the ideology became in a sense the "ideology" of the wider society
too . . .In such a situation interstate and intrastate conflicts become
merged, and each state may expect to find supporters (because they
are supporters of the same ideologies) within the territories of other
states ( 1 976: 69).
Furthermore, this idea has been suggested and accepted by prominent scholars
in international relations. With reference to the specific period which this paper
concerns itself, Hans Morgenthau finds that before the First World War a "system of
supranational ethics" existed that disappeared after the war [( 1948) 1963 : 258,259].
The destruction of this supranational ethic, according to Morgenthau, was the
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elemental reason behind both world wars and the terror and intensity of the Cold War
(Lebow 200 1 ). Also, Samuel Huntington's (1996) work concerning the dominating
influence of cultural conflict in the post-cold war era is squarely based on the idea
that there are different periods of international history.
What follows is a discussion of historical events with which most readers are
already familiar. It is necessary to include an account of these events because they
demonstrate the unique social environment of the international system during the
years between World War I and the end of the Cold War. This is required in any
study of a specific international system, because, "The goal inherent in the study of
international systems is not simply to describe the attributes of particular systems but
to link those attributes to things that transpire within the system" (Zinnes, 1 8). A
secondary goal is to show how and why the international system undergoes social
transition. The only way to do this to is recount the events that demonstrate the
effects of the system on international relations generally and the foreign policies of
specific states.

Before 1 9 14
While the world is constantly changing, there are certain times when the pace
of change accelerates to a level that differentiates these times and establishes them as
dividing lines in history. Such is the case with the First World War. The end of the
nineteenth century witnessed major changes in ethical and philosophical ideas, but
these changes were largely confined to the intellectual world. Only with the coming
of the war did these ideas gain common currency among the mainstream population.
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Accompanying the changes in thought were rapid changes in technology. These
changes made the recently impossible commonplace. Again, many of these new
machines and devices were invented in the years that preceded the war, but it was the
war and the search for technological advantage that it naturally involved that gave
increasing numbers of people experience with these new creations. What is more, the
war not only forced modem thinking and inventions on the populations of the
traditionally affluent countries of Europe but also transmitted these ideas and
experiences to the rest of the world. This combination of evolving thought, dizzying
technological advancement, and global permeation of events marked a new era in
history generally and in international relations specifically.
No period of history can be adequately comprehended without an
understanding of what preceded it, and the First World War is no exception. During
the decades before the war the European world experienced drastic changes in
thought and technology, but these changes were not immediately accompanied by
political and societal change. After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 relative
peace existed in Europe. Trade and technological advancement brought
unprecedented economic growth for most European countries. While there was a
certain amount of wrangling among the leading countries over colonies in Africa and
Asia, there was confidence that professional diplomats would keep the soldiers in
check and that disputes would not get out of control (Craig, 10). The prevailing view
was that Europe was " . . . heading for a kind of high plateau, full of a benign progress
and more abundant civilization, in which the benefits of modem science and
invention would be more widely diffused, and even competitive struggle worked out
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somehow for the best" (Palmer 1957: 660). Even as late as the summer of 1914 there
was general agreement that war was impossible due to the general prosperity that was
largely based on international trade and cooperation (Keegan, 10).
Despite the relative peace and optimism during the late nineteenth century, a
number of developments simultaneously contributed to a growing uneasiness among
the citizenry of Europe. While scientific discoveries seemed to suggest almost
unlimited new possibilities for progress, these discoveries also brought into question
so much of what had been taken for granted concerning the nature of man and the
universe. Certainly Darwin' s writings had begun to undermine the Christian
creationist consensus in Europe. The philosophical underpinnings of European
society were further shaken by scientific insight into the limitlessness of the uni verse,
the composition of the atom, and the discovery that instead of being fixed in space,
stars were in constant motion. In this new world, " ...there could be no reality, no fixed
point from which man could understand the cosmos in which he lived" (Mosse, 289).
Not only did science jeopardize man's understanding of his place in the universe, it
also had the potential to bring about economic dislocation, as increased
mechanization began to cause more unemployment in some sectors of the economy
(Mosse, 284).
The resulting uneasiness provided fertile ground for the growth of new ethical
visions. Certainly among the most important of these were the Nietzschean concepts
of will to power and the superman. Nietzsche advocated that those men who had
power should use it as they saw fit and not be constrained by any prevailing general
concept of morality. Indeed, concerning these individuals, Nietzsche believed that,
46

''Their superman-like quality lay not only in their genius, but in their freedom from
scruples. What they did was right not because sanctioned by any law beyond
themselves, but because they did it. So the Superman will be a law to himself'(Perry,
1 70). In other words, one should seize any opportunity for self-aggrandizement and
be skeptical of any moral code that might forbid him these opportunities. In spite of
this change in the intellectual undercurrent, most people still believed that the
international norms that had prevented war in the nineteenth century would continue
to do the same in the twentieth century (Kohn, 42).
While most in the prewar era most failed to realize the wider implications of
the immense changes that were taking place, the erosion of rational ideals in
philosophy in combination with the increased technological capability for
organization and destruction had implications for the nature of international conflict.
Key among the important technological advances in the late nineteenth century were
the improvement of railroad systems, the development of heavier artillery, and the
machine gun. These allowed armies to mobilize much more quickly and kill much
more effectively. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 demonstrated that warfare had
reached a new level of brutality, but the limited size and scope and geographic
remoteness of this war prevented it from causing a new general understanding of the
nature of war. Thi s did not happen until a decade later with the beginning of First
World War. In the words of one historian the war " . . . provided a preview of the
Pandora's box of evils the linkage of science with industry in the service of war was
to mean" (Baldwin 1962: 159).
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The war itself was initiated not so much because the opposing forces had
concrete war aims but because of a climate of rivalry and fear that had progressively
developed in Europe since the tum of the century. After achieving unification in
1870, Germany became industrially and militarily the strongest state on the European
continent, yet it had almost no territorial possessions outside Europe. Though the
Germans had decisively defeated the French in the Franco-Prussian War, the French
still retained a large colonial empire in Africa and Asia. Great Britain, of course, had
a more extensive colonial empire than that of the French. Whereas the French felt
some degree of discomfort due to their geographic position vis-a-vis Germany, the
British were relatively unaffected initially by the rise of Germany because of the
English Channel and the undisputed superiority of the Royal Navy. However, shortly
after 1900 the Germans embarked on a plan of naval expansion that the British
interpreted as a direct threat to their interests. From this moment on all countries in
Europe began to develop diplomatic and military contingency plans for war. Secret
alliances were concluded and mobilization plans were perfected. In effect, any small
incident could start a chain reaction that would cause all of Europe to plunge into
conflict.

World War I and the Coming of International Ideology
The assassination of an Austro-Hungarian royal in Sarajevo in the summer of
19 14 by a Serbian nationalist proved to be the spark that set off the explosion.
Serbia's ties to Russia brought Russia and Austria-Hungary into conflict and all of
their respective allies with them. Germany was allied to Austria-Hungary and France
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to Russia, so Germany put the Schlieffen Plan, a plan for the mobilization of armies
against France that had been developed more than a decade before 1914, into action
in August 1914. The nature of the Schlieffen Plan, with its activation of reservists
and strict railroad timetables, meant that once enacted it could not easily be halted.
Once in motion, the forces could not be turned back. Although the Schlieffen Plan
was successful in the early stages, German hesitation and the successful French and
British counterattack on the Mame River led to stalemate.
With the failure of the Schlieffen Plan to bring a quick German victory over
France, the opposing Triple Entente and Central Powers armies resorted to digging
trenches after the Battle of the Mame in a supposedly temporary effort to maintain
battle lines and regroup. Instead of being a temporary arrangement, these trenches
would mark the "Western Front," the battle line for the majority of the next four
years. During that time, both sides used any and all means to break the lines and the
will of the enemy. As each side attempted frontal assault after frontal assault only to
be repulsed by the defending force, the true power of the machine gun began to be
understood and casualties mounted. The frustration resulting from the lack of
movement spurred the development and subsequent employment of new weapons
such as mustard gas and the tank.
As important as the developments on the Western Front were, they were
superceded in importance by measures that the opposing militaries took to bring the
war home to their enemies. Leaders reasoned that the stalemate on the battlefield
might be broken by attacking lines of supply and terrorizing civilian populations. The
differentiation between civilian and combatant that had existed before 1914 was
49

shattered when dirigibles began to bomb cities and submarines fired torpedoes into
merchant ships (Craig 1967: 13). Whereas before most civilians had the privilege of
remaining physically and mentally detached from the horror of war, now they were
constantly under threat. This had the effect of hardening civilian public opinion in
favor of the war, and bolstered by government propaganda efforts, civilians began to
view the enemy as thoroughly evil and were loathe to consider anything less than a
complete victory over their dreaded foes (Craig 1967:14). Although the war had
begun as a conflict between armies, it rapidly developed into a conflict between
societies involving every citizen of the countries at war. The concept of total war had
come into its own.
By 1917 the original war aims of both the Allies and the Central Powers were
largely forgotten. So much blood and treasure had been spent for so little return, that
the reasons for going to war in the first place seemed ridiculous. Yet this is the very
reason that each side continued to fight. After spending so much, how could
government leaders tell their respective citizenries that they were now giving up,
effectively making the years of fighting worthless? Some rationale for sustaining
the fight had to be offered. It was under these circumstances that ideology in its
modem sense came into being.
Rivalry and maintenance of the European balance of power were the reasons
that motivated the Allies to go to war in 1914. They certainly had not gone to war
with the goal of bringing freedom to repressed and conquered peoples or establishing
democratic governments in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, after more than three years
of combat it was for these ideals that the British, French, and now the Americans
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claimed to be fighting (Mayer 1959: 368). As the Western democracies increasingly
demonized Germany, they correspondingly began to feel that it was their mission to
save civilization itself (Kennan 1961 : 5). The combined advocacy of European
Socialists and President Woodrow Wilson championing the " . . . rights of small
nations, popular control of foreign policy, control of armaments, and international
organization . . . " seemed to offer the correct rationale for enduring until the Kaiser and
his hordes were finally beaten down (Mayer 1959: 39-40). The initial outline of one
of the major international ideologies that would define the twentieth century was now
beginning to take shape.
The other major ideology that began to attract strong international interest
during the close and aftermath of the war was communism. While Marxist and
socialist parties had existed throughout Europe in the decades before the war, none of
the national governments on either side went to war with goal of making the world
more receptive to international communism. However, by 1917 Imperial Russia had
been experiencing revolutionary pangs for more than a decade. Encouraged by the
abysmal failure of Russian armies in Eastern Europe, socialist groups in Russia
successfully deposed Czar Alexander and began fighting among themselves for
power. Eventually, Lenin and his Bolsheviks emerged as the rulers of a new Soviet
Russia. The Bolsheviks negotiated a peace treaty with Germany and exited the war.
While the Russian revolution was unquestionably a brutal affair, it represented
another vision of hope for war weary countries. Lenin's short-term objective was the
destruction of capitalist class in Russia involving whatever means necessary, but
". .. his ultimate objective of the classless society in a warless world has the same
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hopeful and utopian quality as Wilson's search for a peaceful community of
sovereign democratic nations of unequal power" (Mayer 1959: 393). Each of these
ideas represented a way to overcome the feverish nationalism that led to war. As the
war dragged into its fourth year, new visions for the postwar world had manifested ·
themselves.
With the failure of the German offensive in the spring of 1918 and the
renewed strength of the Western Allies due to reinforcement by the American
Expeditionary Force, the Allies finally broke the German line. In November of 1918
the German government sued for peace and the war came to a close. Wilson, and the
leaders of the other major victorious powers, George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, the
so-called Big Four, came to Versailles in hopes of creating a postwar environment
that would discourage a repetition of the World War. At the same time, communist
parties began to spring up in the defeated countries.
The conclusion of the war represented a new world situation for both the
victors and the vanquished. Not only the Russian and German empires, but also those
of the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians had vanished from the map. The total
number of combatant and civilian casualties on both sides amounted to some fifteen
million. Though armies were no longer in the field, Europe would not quickly find
peace and equilibrium for some time. During the years after the war a disarray
existed which led:

. . . on the one hand, to utopian expectations of a total renovation of
life out of the primary or primitive forces of race, or out of a world
purged of corruption and decay. The very chaos of the postwar era
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was to give birth to a new cosmos which would justify the sufferings
of the war. The same distress produced, on the other hand, a deep
pessimism, the discovery of the new meaningless of life, of history,
and of civilization (Kohn 1967:36).
By undermining the norms of civilization that had existed before 19 14, the war made
common understanding of the irrationalism that had existed only in intellectual circles
before the war (Roth 1967:33). In the words of George Kennan, the indirect genetic
and spiritual effects of the war " . . . penalized victor and vanquished in roughly equal
measure, and . . . the damage they inflicted, even on those who were nominally the
victors, was greater than anything at stake in the issues of the war itself' ( 1 96 1 :9).
The international ideologies that manifested themselves in 1 9 17, Wilsonian
liberalism and communism, now were viewed as the two viable ways of dealing with
the problems of the postwar era. Wilson's most important idea was the League of
Nations, which posited that through international cooperation and collective security
the threat of future world war could be averted. The League represented a significant
departure in the history of international relations because it was the first organization
to give legal status to certain ideas about international conduct and also because it
was the first to acknowledge that states increasingly shared interests that would be
more effectively pursued under a centralized, international organization (Armstrong,
Lloyd, and Redmond, 32).
The League was only one outcome of the war that indicated the end of the
supremacy of Europe and the initiation of a truly international system. The League
granted formal legal equality to smaller states in Europe and those outside Europe
with the European powers, something that had never occurred before the war
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(Brucan, 152). However, in granting non-European states memberships in the
League, the League played a role in internationalizing some European norms.
Foremost among these was the idea of the modem nation-state (Tambiah, 124), which
many of the political entities that emerged from the form empires of Eastern Europe
adopted. Throughout the rest of the century all states became organized on this
principle. Finally, the war had demonstrated that ideology was integral for the
mobilization of an entire national citizenry (Cassels, 138). To compete and survive in
international politics in the twentieth century national leaders had to become affiliated
with and espouse some sort of ideology. The two most important ideologies,
Wilson's liberal internationalism and Leninist Marxism further internationalized the
nature of the post World War I era because:

In many ways the most significant feature both of Wilson's
Programme and of Lenin's is that they were not European centred
but world embracing: that is to say, both set out to appeal to all
peoples of the world, irrespective of race and colour. Both implied
a negation of the preceding European system, whether it was
confined to Europe or whether it spread (as it had done during the
preceding generation) over the whole world (Barraclough, 1 2 1 ).
It is not surprising that the bearers of these ideologies immediately came into
conflict following the First World War. The Western Allies sent armies to Russia to
assist the enemies of the Bolsheviks that were still actively resisting the establishment
of the Soviet Union. While the Western effort to destroy communism in its infancy
was a failure, it both demonstrated the nature of and set the tone for all international
relations for the next seventy years. Great Britain, the United States, and others sent
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armies to fight against a newly established state that had been ravaged by war and
revolution and, thus, had little power to threaten the victors of the First World War.
Ideology was the prime motivation for this action, and it initiated the mutual hatred
between the capitalist democratic West and the communist East that was to color
international relations for the better part of the century. This has led one scholar to
declare that conflict in post-World War I Russia marked the beginning of the Cold
War (Schuman, 79-80). From this point on ideology would be a major influence on
the foreign policy calculations of states.

The Fascist Challenge
One other integrating influence of war and its aftermath was the global
economic system. The new international economy and its implications were very
much related to ideology. The Versailles Treaty and the reparations that it contained
served to increase the interdependence of the world economy. While it seemed that
most, if not all, European countries would adopt some form of parliamentary
government in the years immediately following the war (Berman, 4), postwar
economic instability caused among other reasons by Germany's inability to pay its
war indemnity brought the wisdom of the democracy, capitalism, and collective
security advocated by the victors of World War I into doubt in many countries in
Europe and elsewhere. The withdrawal of the United States from European affairs
and the half-hearted efforts of the British to become involved in solutions to the
economic problems of the period also did little to help. As many countries slipped
into economic despair, the indispensability of ideology in forming party and platform
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continued to assert itself, and leaders in opposition to free market capitalism
advocated either Marxist or fascist solutions to their countries' problems. The
twenties and early thirties were marked by civil conflict, sometimes violent, among
social democratic, Marxist, and fascist parties.
As the Great Depression illustrated the weakness of the democratic and
capitalist systems, it to a significant degree opened the door for fascist extremists in
Italy, Germany, and Japan, to take power (Mallia-Millanes, 42). Of course, the third
ideology spawned by World War I, fascism, did not have an international appeal but
rather was overtly based on the supreme affirmation of nationalism. Although
lacking in international appeal and largely discredited after the Second World War,
fascism was similar to communism in that it promised salvation by giving immense
power to a single party under a strong leader. The totalitarian aspect of German and
Italian fascism and Russian Bolshevism was similar in that the war had so utterly
destroyed previous norms and institutions of government that the populations of these
countries were ready to accept dictatorial leadership (Friedrich, 1967). Because of
fascism' s hostility to the international visions posed by the two predominant world
ideologies it was inevitable that it would come into conflict with them. However, the
countries that represented the two opposing major international ideologies each hoped
that the fascists would serve to eliminate their enemy. This meant that the fascists
would have an opportunity to terrorize much of the world before the democracies and
communist Russia came together in common effort to oppose them.
By the mid-1930s fascist regimes in Italy and Germany had consolidated
power and were looking for allies. They found one in Spain' s General Francisco
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Franco, who had initiated civil war by trying to overthrow the democratically elected
Popular Front Government in July 1936. Although the Republican Popular Front was
democratic, it had as its mission the reconciliation of Western democracy and Russian
communism (Deutscher, 422), and it was largely distrusted by the Western
democracies. The British, in particular, feared that if they supported the Spanish
Republican government it might lead to communist gains elsewhere in Western
Europe (Mallia-Milanes, 93). Stalin, however, eventually felt compelled to intervene
in support of the Popular Front because it had become increasingly identified with
international communism (Ulam, 244). The failure of the British to intervene was
interpreted in Moscow as being in support of fascism and in opposition to the Soviet
Union (Taylor, 1 25). While Stalin did not commit materiel and men to the Popular
Front to the extent that Hitler and Mussolini contributed to Franco's fascists, the very
fact that the leading fascist and communist powers had become involved in a
supposedly civil war demonstrated the surging influence of ideology on international
relations. Whereas during the preceding century the European powers consulted
each other during crises with the objective of limiting conflict, now for reasons of
ideology leaders attempted to expand conflict.
In addition to the democratic countries' decision to ignore the threat of
fascism on the Iberian peninsula, Britain and France achieved what amounted to a
cancellation of their promise to defend Czechoslovakia by allowing the Nazis to take
the Sudetenland in 1938. This instance of appeasement of fascism removed all doubt
in Stalin's mind concerning whether the western European democracies were turning
a blind eye to fascism in hopes that it would destroy Soviet Russia. When in August
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1939 Hitler sent his foreign minister to meet with Stalin with the goal of negotiating a
non-aggression pact, " . . . it is probable that he (Stalin) saw the Soviet-German Pact as
a convenient device by which he could divert Hitler's aggressive dynamism in the
opposite direction" (Liddell-Hart, 14). For a period of almost two years the Nazis did
indeed direct their might against France and Great Britain, but, inevitably, Stalin's
hopes that Germany would be content to destroy democracy in Western Europe and
no more were shattered when Hitler turned his forces eastward against Russia in the
summer of 194 1.
The growth of fascism had been encouraged not only by the nonintervention
of western democracies in the Spanish Civil War and Czechoslovakia in 1938, but
also by the failure of the democratic powers to intervene on behalf of China when
Japan had invaded Manchuria in 193 1 and the failure of the League to deal forcefully
with Italy when it invaded Ethiopia in 1935. During 1939 and 1940, fascism made
significant gains as Hitler overwhelmed most of Europe and the Japanese ran rampant
in East Asia. 1941, however, was to be the turning point because this was the year in
which the fascists overstepped. In the past, whether by plan or happenstance, the
fascist states had been successful because the forces of democracy in the West and
communist Russia were divided. The German attack on Russia and the Japanese
attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor served to unite the West and
Soviet Russia in an ultimately successful effort to destroy fascism.
The Second World War deepened the trends that were initiated during the
First World War. The war aims of the states that fought the First World War were
vague and only evolved into ideological aims in the latter part of the war. The Second
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World War began on the other hand (although it must be said that it began at different
times for different states) with a clear ideological mission on the part of the Western
European powers, the US and the USSR: to rid the world of fascism. The reason that
it did not begin earlier was that both the capitalist democracies and the Soviet Union
hoped that the fascists would destroy the other. In other words, not only the decisions
during the war, but also those made in the decade preceding the war were strongly
influenced by ideology. Also, while World War I involved participants from many
countries outside of Europe, most of the fighting was confined to Europe. The
Second World War was truly a global conflict in that Asia, Africa, and all of the
world's oceans were theatres of major conflict.

The Cold War and Increasing Ideological Conflict
The coalition of allies that came together to defeat fascism was to endure only
as long as the war itself. Even before the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945 the
Western Allies and the Soviet communists had begun to renew their suspicions of one
another. With the threat of fascism successfully extinguished, the ideological conflict
between Western Europe and Soviet Russia that had existed before the was quickly
renewed. The Western powers along with the Soviets occupied Germany and soon
thereafter fell into disagreement about the disposition of a future German state,
eventually resulting in a divided Germany. Rather than pulling back from Eastern
Europe, Stalin proceeded to set up communist governments in Eastern European
states that were loyal to the Soviet Union. Within five years of war's end, the Soviets
had successfully exploded an atomic bomb, the Western allies had formalized their
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common defense of Western Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
as a result the battle lines of the Cold War had been drawn.
During the years between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin
Wall ideological conflict was the dominant motivating factor in international
relations. The Western Allies, and particularly the United States, commenced
offering economic and military aid to countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
the Middle East in hopes that these countries would embrace democracy, trade, and
collective security and shun communism. The Soviet Union offered aid to counter
western influence. The major hot wars of the period, in Korea, Vietnam, and
Afghanistan, all had strong ideological elements. It is hard to see why the United
States would have intervened in Asian conflicts in countries that did not have
resources or traditional relationships with the US unless ideology was the motivating
factor. While one could certainly argue that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan might
have been undertaken by a Russia that was not Communist, again it is difficult to
understand why the United States would have given aid to Afghanistan for any other
motivation than ideology. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of
ideological conflict, did the United States cease giving aid to Afghanistan. Similarly,
it is unlikely that the Soviets would have been interested in Cuba had it not been for
the ideological conflict presented by the Cold War. The Cold War caused nearly
every country to move towards one of the two major ideologies and plan their foreign
relations accordingly. Countries that had somehow avoided ideological attachment
and conflict before World War II were increasingly drawn into an ideological
environment that offered only two choices.
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Following the Second World War militant Marxist ideology began to be
embraced by many countries outside of Soviet control and gained many adherents in
the developing world. As postwar decolonization ensued in Asia and Africa, newly
independent governments and those who were not yet independent but were anxious
for independent status found it necessary to organize under the mantle of a recognized
ideological framework. Inevitably, many of the groups in the developing world
struggling to gain or consolidate independence turned to communism. This was not
necessarily because of a belief in the correctness of orthodox Marxism. Rather,
according to George Kennan:

. . . the power of Communist inspiration would prove
to reside not in anything essential to the structure of Marxist
thought, but in the infectious example of a political movement
successfully contemptuous and defiant of old Europe; in the
identification of the Marxist slogan of imperialism with the
national and racial resentments of peoples emerging from
colonialism in many parts of the world; in the political fascination
inevitably radiated by any effective despotism in an age of change
and uncertainty; in the inacceptability, to many ruling groups, of
the liberal freedoms of the West; and, finally, in a pervasive
illusion that the devices of Communist dictatorship in Russia
represented a short cut, available to any people, to the glories of
industrial and military power (1961: 8).
Once independence had been established and political control legitimized, new
communist governments would interpret and practice communism according to their
own indigenous forms (Halberstam, 339). This does not mean that communism was
merely a fa�ade and had no ramifications for government procedure and policy in the
developing world, but that communism was a contemporary vehicle for expressing
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more traditional national ideas and sentiments. Only by understanding communism
and local custom in tandem were policy and action made and only by understanding
these two influences in tandem can policy and action be understood.
This was also true of the states that chose democracy and collective security.
Whether strong state states or weak ones, each state attempted to work within the
international organizations in which it held membership to advance its own interests.
While member states might aspire to the ideals of western civilization and liberal
ideology, understanding of these concepts was always viewed through the prism of
states' individual historical experiences. The situation of collective security and
regional defense organizations was similar to that of the United Nations in that
". . . many member states were conditioned to view the United Nations as an
instrument for the advancement of their exclusive policies" (Ziring, Riggs, and Plano,
3).

The First World War initiated the overturning of the international social order.
A loosely integrated international order ruled by European colonial powers was
replaced by a more tightly integrated world order that was presided over by two
strong states, both partially but neither completely European, that championed
opposing ideologies. One author, describing the confrontation between the Soviet
Union and its Eastern European satellites and the United States and Western
European states claims that,

Ideological patterns, whether arising from the communist world or
from the West and America, proffered blue prints to give form to a
new international order. The pluralist West devised numerous
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patterns and variations on the democratic idea, Soviet Russia proffered
one. Yet in each case ideology proposed patterns to undergird or
legitimize new order (Seabury, 100).
In a wider sense this description describes not just postwar Europe but the entire
international system during the twentieth century. The new order was a social system
that limited state options concerning the general form of government that they would
choose. All states with the exception of a few monarchies and sultanates chose one or
other of these two all-encompassing visions that were fostered by the First World
War and increasingly dominated international politics during the twentieth century.
Certainly, there were states that tried fascism or nonalignment, but nearly all of these
states eventually moved toward one camp or the other. That there were at times
major divisions within each movement was only natural. For each state that
professed either of these international ideals could only do so to the extent that they
understood them. No two states could have identical understandings of outlooks that
were as broad and malleable as these. What is more, understanding of ideology was
unlikely to be greater than the reason for choosing a particular ideology, and the
reason that motivated choice of ideology was none other than the " . . . accommodation
of the one omnipresent and thriving ideology, that is to say, nationalism" (Cassels,
180).

Nationalism, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, is always to some
extent a product of national culture. Indeed, the two can never be completely
separated. Chapters IV and V will show why and how two very different national
societies opted for a different international vision during the twentieth century and
63

also how the two ideologies provided a means of evolution for the two societies'
national cultures. Just as the foreign policies of the major powers were strongly
affected by the ideological nature of the international system, so were the foreign
policies of Turkey and China. Turkey and China immediately experienced new
circumstances following the First World War. The disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire forced the Turks form an independent state, but, unlike many of the new
states that gained independence during the twentieth century, Turkey sought
membership in the Western community. The reason for this was that the Turks had a
cultural tradition of affiliating with the strongest civilization. The concept of
Wilsonian internationalism provided Turkey with an opportunity to act out its
traditional role of forming affiliations with states from an established civilization by
joining Western international organizations.
Membership in these organizations also constrained Turkey's foreign policy
options during the twentieth century because Turkey placed such a strong emphasis
on being a loyal member of these organizations. This, as will later be shown, was the
overriding goal of Turkish foreign policy. This meant that the Turks often were
willing to do more than most other member states to demonstrate their loyalty to the
organization, leaving Turkey vulnerable to manipulation by more powerful states
within these organizations. Turkey was at a particular disadvantage vis-a-vis the
United States because of Turkish overconfidence in both the nature of American
friendship and in the strength of Turkish-American cooperation within NATO.
China, on the other hand, was the heir to a completely independent civilization
that had suffered at the hands of Western colonial powers for the better part of a
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century. Up until the late eighteenth century China was easily the most influential
state in Asia, and its methods of governance were admired the world over. However,
by 1 800 Western states had moved far ahead of China economically, technologically,
and militarily and Western states, particularly Britain and France, exploited their
ability to extract concessions from China. China, once secure in its position as the
cultural center of the earth, now was ravaged by Western merchants, missionaries and
armies. China was largely passive in its attempts to halt Western intervention until
the end of the First World War. Although uprisings against Western intervention in
China, such as the Boxer Rebellion, did occur, these were the exception and not the
rule. The coming of modem international ideology, however, presented the Chinese
with an opportunity to revitalize their traditional role as the cultural center of the
Eastern world and a great power by accepting and advocating revolutionary Marxism.
This had important implications for Chinese foreign policy in that China had to
portray itself as a revolutionary state committed to violent opposition to any foreign
aggressor.
These implications were represented by the PRC' s frequent initiation of
border conflicts during the years between the establishment of the People's Republic
in 1949 and the demise of the Cold War. During this time the Chinese had did not
have a modernized military force and experienced periods of domestic social
upheaval, but they still chose to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, initiating
military conflict with both the United States and the Soviet Union. The sixth chapter
will provide a focused comparison of how the relationship between specific national
cultures and international environment affect Turkish and Chinese foreign policy
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decision-making. By analyzing foreign policy decisions made by Turkish and
Chinese leaders in situations of immediate extended deterrence, it is hoped that a
deeper understanding of how national cultural and international social factors work in
tandem to constrain foreign policy decisions.
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CHAPTER IV
TURKEY AND THE WORLD
DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD
AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Turkish foreign policy
decision-making during the period from World War I to the end of the Cold War was
influenced by a combination of traditional Turkish ways of dealing with the world
and the international social environment during that period. This chapter thus
provides the context for the examination of the Turkish decision in the Cyprus crisis
of 1964. This specific case will be analyzed in detail in Chapter VI. Because the
central idea of this research project is that culture affects decision-making, before the
actual decision is discussed the cultural history that manifested itself in the decision
of 1964 must first be related.
It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss or summarize all of the traits of
Turkish culture and history. Rather, the objective is to illustrate the following points
that are specifically related to this study. First, the Turks, unlike many national
groups, have not been consistently identified with one civilization but have sought
membership in different civilizations at different times. Second, because of their lack
of identification with one civilization the Turks have a cultural need for affiliation
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that was demonstrated in the role that the Turks played within the Ottoman Empire
during the time between the tenth century and the First World War. Finally, after the
destruction of the Ottoman Empire the Turks demonstrated their cultural need for
affiliation by enthusiastically seeking membership in Western international
organizations and doing more than was necessary to fulfill their obligations to these
organizations.
What follows is a description of Turkey's historical interaction with the
world. Inherent in this historical account are certain patterns of interaction that are
repeatedly demonstrated by the Turks and that represent the culture of Turkish
international relations. First, the general pattern of Turkish action in the world before
the First World War is described. Then, the specific manifestation of this cultural
pattern during the period between the First World War and the end of the Cold War
will be discussed. It is in this period that the Cyprus crisis falls, and, therefore,
special attention will be given to this period of history.
The argument here is that the salient feature of Turkish relations with the
world is a desire to be affiliated with something larger than Turkey itself. This
dominating facet of Turkish relations with the world has been demonstrated in the
Turks' international actions during the last millennium and manifests itself in both a
facile ability to cooperate with others and a marked insecurity about Turkey's place in
the world. This aspiration has grown out of Turkish historical experience and the
related factor of Turkish geography and has affected Turkish perception of other
countries' intentions and of Turkey's own role in the international system.
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Several scholars have commented on modem Turkey's identity problems, and
they generally agree that these problems have developed because of the confusion in
Turkish society concerning whether Turkey should be identified with Europe or with
the Islamic world. Aspects of this problem include the ambiguous nature of Turkey's
geographical position (Carley, 3), value conflicts within Turkey between groups that
lean toward the West and those that strongly identify with the Islamic world (Mardin
1998: 2 12), and the rapidly implemented policies of modernization and secularization
introduced by Ataturk (Carley, 11-12). Modem Turkey's quest to understand its own
identity has even been described as "schizophrenic" (Poulton, chapter 10). The point
that will be made in the following paragraphs is that recent Turkish aspirations and
identity problems are not simply an outgrowth of events in the twentieth century but
part of a larger pattern spanning many centuries.
Turkey manifested this behavior during the twentieth century by seeking
inclusion in the Western community of states. The social environment of the
international system during the period from World War I until the last decade of the
century dictated that the way a country could become identified with a group of other
countries was to gain entrance into international organizations of which these
countries were also a member. For Turkey, a society that had historically sought
affiliation with strong and established civilizations, the direction of their foreign
policy was clear, the way to achieve this inclusion was to gain membership in
Western based international organizations. Membership in these organizations and
bilateral ties with Western states served not only Turkey's security and economic
interests but also Turkey's "psychological" interests (Birnbaum, 188).
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Turkey and the World Before WWI
The Turks have not always occupied the area of the present Turkish Republic,
but instead have been a people who have lived in different areas at different times.
Originating in central Asia just northwest of China, Turkish tribes began migrating
westward during the middle of the first millennium A.D. Initially, these tribes did not
migrate in unison. However, many of these tribes allied themselves together when
attacked by the native inhabitants of the lands through which the Turks were passing
(McCarthy, 3). It is possible that the Turks began this migration because of Chinese
expansion. Regardless of the reason, this initial westward movement initiated a
migratory instinct in the Turkish people.
This penchant for migration involved a search for not only a homeland, but
also social acceptance. In other words, physical dislocation led to social dislocation.
Scholars have noted that Turkey is a "lonely" country due to her unique cultural
history and geographic position (Volkan and Iskowitz, 190). Group responses to the
environment produced social tendencies. The urge to overcome this sense of social
dislocation manifested itself in Turkish attempts to become part of the most
prestigious civilizations. While making temporary arrangements with many different
groups, the Turks only sought to forge long lasting bonds with the strongest groups of
states. This search for identity provided the Turks with much interesting experience.
During their period of migration, many Turks accepted and most later relinquished a
variety of religions. According to Berkes, the Turks have ". . . passed successively
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through Shamanism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Islam,
carrying traces of all these religions alive in their national culture" ( 1964: 50 1 ).
During their period of migration before becoming part of the Ottoman Empire,
the Turks made notable but impermanent relationships with the Greeks and Persians
and integrated many various smaller groups into their own. In his study of pre
Ottoman Turkey, Cahen finds that the defining characteristic of Turkish culture
during this period was the facility to enter into symbiotic relationships with other
cultures, and with the Greeks and Persians in particular (1969: 370). Also during
their period in Anatolia before becoming part of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks
assimilated many of the earlier inhabitants of the region-including Hittites, Greeks,
Armenians, Mongols, and Kurds-into their numbers (Hotham, 8). A recent
archeological study has confirmed that the area of the present Turkish Republic has
been either home or passage way for an extraordinary number of different ethnic
groups, asserting that the relics of as many as fifty identifiable ethnic groups could be
found in Turkey (Pope and Pope 1997: 19-20). All of these instances suggest that the
Turks, for better or for worse, were not inclined to guard their identity by maintaining
a distance from others but attempted to find their identity through entering into
cooperative relationships with others.
Nevertheless, as stated above, the majority of the relationships that the pre
Ottoman Turks made with other cultural groups were not enduring. Only with the
rise of the Ottoman Empire did the Turks find a culture with which they could make a
lasting relationship. Instead of being forced to convert to Islam, as were many other
national and ethnic groups were (B. Lewis 1 955: 322), the Turks accepted Islam
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because, in the words of Kemal Karpat, Islam gave the Turkish state "purpose" and
"meaning" (1959: 3). Although the Turks were in part attracted to Islam because it
was similar to other religions that the Turks had adopted in that it was monotheistic,
". . . what must have had as least as much weight with the Turks who came over to
Islam in such numbers during the tenth century was that acceptance of Islam
automatically conferred citizen-rights in a vast and flourishing civilization" (G. Lewis
1974: 28). At the time the Ottoman civilization was vastly superior to its European
counterpart in the areas of military capability, philosophy, science, material wealth,
and manners (B. Lewis 1993: 8). In other words, the Turks finally settled into a
long-term relationship with the Arabs and Persians within the Ottoman Empire
because it offered the opportunity of being included in an advanced civilization.
The Turks asserted themselves within the Ottoman Empire by making strong
military contributions and became the leaders of the empire. Many of the first Turks
who came to the Middle East came as slaves who were specifically trained for
military functions. Furthermore, because of the Turkish position on the frontiers of
Islam, the Turks became experienced in the military arts, allowing them to gain
stature within the Islamic world. Also, as much of the territory bordering the areas
around the Islamic world was populated by people of Turkish origin, Turks who were
already converted to Islam and committed to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire
were well positioned to convert and thereby coopt people living on the Western
borders of the empire. In 1055, the first strong group of Turkish Muslims, the
Seljuqs, conquered Iraq, and within several years also overwhelmed the Syria and
Palestine. In 1071, the Seljuqs defeated the Byzantines at Manzikart, a feat for which
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the Arabs had striven for in vain. This victory established Turkish leadership in what
was becoming the Ottoman Empire.
However, for all of the Turks' military success, they still looked to other
members of the Empire for cultural identification. The Arabs were the original
bearers of Islam, and the Persians brought a strong literary tradition to the Empire. It
was to these cultural influences that Turks looked as much as their own (Pope and
Pope, 14). This is evidenced by the fact that early Ottoman political documents were
written in Persian (Kadafar, 61) and even the successful exploits of Turkish military
heroes were related within the context of older Arabian military adventures (Kadafar,
63). Outside of their military prowess, the Turks made little contribution to the
Islamic cause. In fact, from the time that the Turks came into control of the Ottoman
Empire the cultural and economic life of the region went into decline (Bregel, 72).
During the centuries of Ottoman strength, the Turks became increasingly
integrated into the empire. The Turks were content to be identified with an Islamic
civilization that was superior to that of Europe and at least equal with that of China.
This was evidenced in the fact that the Turks " . . . submerged their identity in Islam
to a greater extent than perhaps any other Islamic people" (B. Lewis 1955: 324).
Also, the Turks saw themselves as the guardians of Islam and opposed differing
interpretations of scripture and the growth of sects within the Ottoman Empire that
resulted from disagreement over the meaning of the Koran (Adnan-Adivar 1951:
119).
When circumstances began to change with the rise of European power during
the seventeenth century, the Turks were not quick to give up their belief of Ottoman
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superiority (Berkes, 25). However, after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic
Wars the growing strength of Europe was evident and the Ottomans attempted to
reform their bureaucracy and military along European lines. Many Turks became
exposed to European culture and were impressed with both its material and
organizational success. This inspired several movements during the latter half of the
nineteenth century in favor of more general reform of the Ottoman system. The most
prominent of these movements were the "Young Ottoman" and "Young Turk"
movements. Although these movements paralleled the nationalistic movements
taking place in other countries during the period, the overriding goal of both Young
Ottomans and the Young Turks was not to establish a separate Turkish state but to
restore the Ottoman Empire to its former glory (Berkes, 22 1 and 305).
This is not to say that the Turks completely lost their distinct sense of identity
during the Ottoman Era. The Turks were intent on remaining a unified group. This is
demonstrated by the fact that they retained folk customs and the Turkish language,
although in modified form. These enduring elements of Turkish culture represented a
potential basis for creating a Turkish state (Karpat 2000: 22), but the Turks were
conflicted about actively drawing distinctions between themselves and others within
the empire. This is because they were " . . .intent on retaining intact a multi-ethnic
Empire. Many of them wished to strengthen their 'Turkishness' , but were afraid of
alienating non-Turks" (McCarthy, 209). Other groups within the empire were not as
conflicted as the Turks. The Christian groups within the empire, such as the
Armenians, wanted complete independence, and even other Islamic groups within the
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empire like the Arabs and Albanians did much more to emphasize their racial
distinctiveness than did the Turks (Berkes, 3 19).
The First World War marked a major change in international politics, and the
Ottoman Empire was to feel its impact in a dramatic way. The Ottomans
unsuccessfully attempted to make an alliance with Britain before the war and then
tried to remain neutral, but finally became allied with the Central Powers for a variety
of reasons (Tuchman 1962: 137-141). These reasons included a longstanding fear of
Russia, who was now allied with the Ottoman' s erstwhile allies, Great Britain and
France. Also, the British reneged on selling the Ottomans two naval vessels, claiming
that the Royal Navy needed the ships. The Germans then proceeded to make a gift to
the Turks of two warships. The combined effect of these circumstances was an
Ottoman alliance with the Germans and Austrians.

Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic
The outcome of the war was disastrous for the Ottoman Empire. Significant
groups of Arabs had not even fought with Turks, but instead decided to cooperate
with the British. At war' s end, the empire was in a state of collapse and it seemed
that all of the territories and peoples of the empire would come under control of the
victorious Allied Powers. However, General Mustafa Kemal rallied the Turks and
under his leadership they established a Turkish Republic on the Anatolian peninsula
in 1 922. The Turks seemingly had been forced by events to make a life for
themselves.
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Kemal, later known as Ataturk, undertook many secularizing reforms that
drastically lessened the power of Islam within Turkey. Some of these reforms were
aimed at changing the customs of the people, such as banning the fez or prohibiting
women from wearing traditional Islamic dress. Other reforms were of a more
blatantly political nature, such as discontinuing the sultanate and caliphate. While
these reforms seem to be a direct repudiation of Turkish sentiment in the pre-war era,
it can be argued that the Turks were acting much as they had when they accepted
Islam centuries before in that they were making efforts to become identified with a
new and superior civilization. This was further symbolized by the Turkish attempt to
rid their language and law code of Arabic and Persian influences and replacing them
with European influences on language and law (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 188). Just as
the Ottoman Empire had been economically, philosophically, and militarily superior
during the tenth century, so was western civilization at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Berkes claims that this was the overriding concern of the new republic,
stating that, "The supreme problem was, therefore, to develop the country along the
lines of Western civilization. . . . To reach the stage achieved by the civilized nations !
That became the motif of the new ideology"(1964: 463). Reflecting this desire,
Ataturk claimed that the two fundamental needs of the Turkish people were
independence and civilization (Hotham, 23) and asked, "Can one name a single
nation that has not turned to the West in its quest for civilization?" (Mango, 1999:
396).
Ataturk's success in imposing secular reforms was in part due to the strong
leadership he exhibited in the war of independence, but it was also due to the fact that
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a significant portion of the population of the new republic wanted to be part of
western civilization. This was demonstrated by writings of a leading Turkish social
theorist of the period of the day, Ziya Golkap, who claimed that Turkish culture was
influenced by European civilization as much as it was by Islamic civilization
(Golkap, 167). Whether this was true or not, it was accepted by many Turks because
it " . . . allowed national pride to be reconciled with the adoption of European ways"
(Zurcher 1993: 36). Even the name of the new republic, Turkey, was of European
origin, and was adopted in spite of the fact that it had long had a negative connotation
in both the Ottoman and European worlds (B . Lewis 1 998: 60).
What is striking about Turkey's adoption of Western methods is that the rest
of the ethnic and national groups that once composed the now defunct Ottoman
Empire did exactly the opposite. According to Bernard Lewis:

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the experience of
Turkey in Westernization was in general shared with the former Arab
provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Since 1 9 1 8 there has been a complete
divergence. In Turkey the stream has been broadened and deepened;
elsewhere it has been deflected or turned back (1955 : 3 1 3).
The Turks, once the most enthusiastic and devout members of the Ottoman Empire,
were now embracing European civilization with the same fervor as they has
demonstrated when becoming affiliated with the Arabs and Persians under the mantle
of Islam a thousand years before.
The orthodox view of Turkish foreign policy during the Ataturk era is that it
was decidedly neutralist. This is undoubtedly true up to a point, but it is not
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completely so. This is because Ataturk and the many other Turkey's leaders, as
described above, felt a strong need to identity with the West. In the early twenties,
just what states comprised the "West" was in question. Even the Germans and
Russians were drawing on Western ideas as a basis for their new governments.
Therefore, Turkey was unsure of how to proceed other than to maintain a neutralist
policy. This was the case until Turkey could gain membership in the League of
Nations.
From the beginning of the Republic then, it was clear that Turkey would cast
its lot with the West and its ideas of democracy and collective security. Although
Turkey had no history of democratic government, its desire to be a part of the West
meant that it would have to eventually erect a governmental structure similar to that
of Western countries. Turkey's democratic evolution was not a smooth one as
Ataturk often governed by decree and the post Ataturk era was marked by periodic
military coups, but the nature of its general progress toward democracy during the
twentieth century is undisputed. If adopting democratic government proved to be a
way within Turkey for Turks to demonstrate that they were part of the Western world,
membership in the League would demonstrate Turkish allegiance to Western
international ideals and provide the formal affiliation with the West the as the Turks
desired.
During Turkey's war for independence and survival the League had the goal
of destroying Ataturk's rebellion and dividing Turkish territory among the Western
powers. However, once the Turks won the war they quickly forgave and spent the
majority of the 1920s attempting to become a member of the League. This was in
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spite of the fact that in 1926 the League decided in favor of Iraq in a border dispute
between Turkey and the British dominion of Iraq (Hardie, 77-78). The fact that the
Turks coveted League membership after these two instances of opposition seems to
confirm that it wanted to gain identification with the West by becoming a member of
the League. This was summed up by a member of the Turkish assembly, who stated
concerning Turkey's admission to the League, "The idea of the League of Nations is
one which is held in great esteem by the Turkish Revolution and the Turkish
Republic. We might almost say that it is one of our own ideas." [Speech by Tevfik
Rustu Aras, 15 July 1931, in the Grand National Assembly. (Turkey and the United
Nations, 31)]. Within several years Turkey was given an opportunity to show its
allegiance to the League. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was a blow to the
League's prestige (Turkey and the United Nations, 35), nevertheless, Turkey upheld
the League policy of economic sanctions against Italy even though it hurt trade
relations with the Italians (Danilov, 122).
Having learned the price of involvement in world war during 1914-18, the
Turks successfully stayed out of most of the Second World War. The Turks did come
in on the Allied side once the Germans were on the defensive, in early 1945. The
reason that compelled them to declare war on the Third Reich was membership in the
soon to be organized United Nations (Turkey and the United Nations, 71). Once
again, the Turks had acted only when they were promised membership in an
international organization that was based in the West and organized on Western
principles.
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After the war Britain was Turkey' s principal Western ally, but, in accordance
with its shrinking power and resources, the British decided to relinquish this role.
The United States, much to the pleasure of Turkey, took over this role by extending
military aid to Turkey, along with Greece, during the years immediately after the war
under the Truman Doctrine. However, the Truman Doctrine only increased Turkey' s
desire to build broader relationships with the West, and the United States in
particular. According to Kemal Karpat, ''The new role as partners of the West and
especially the uninhibited friendship of the United States, the defender of Western
civilization, was in some Turkish eyes the proof that they were finally accepted and
became part of the Western world" ( 1 975: 6).
At the end of World War II the United States had realized that it could no
longer depend on Great Britain to maintain global stability, and the rise of the
Communist bloc only reinforced this notion. When the Soviets abandoned even the
pretense of peaceful coexistence with the West and began working to inspire
Communist revolutions abroad, the US adopted a general policy that would attempt to
" . . . organize the Free World into an anti-communist coalition that could overlook
pressing local demands in order to ward off the international conspiracy" (Whetten,
1 2). In the early postwar era one of the main tools the US employed to oppose this
international conspiracy of communism was the UN. In 1949 only six of the sixty
four members of the UN were communist countries, and the US believed that the rest
of the members would vote with the US (Krasner, 63). This situation further
contributed to the Turkish perception that the US was strongly linked to the UN and
that support of one meant support of the other.
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The initiation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 represented
another opportunity for the Turks to become more closely identified with the West.
It was clear that the Turks saw NATO membership as a symbol of membership in the
Western community (Tachau, 174). After Turkey was denied full membership in its
initial bid for entry there was considerable disappointment reflecting Turkish
concerns about its standing in the West, leading one Turkish newspaperman to
comment that Turkey " . . . wanted to be a real and contributing part of the Western
family, and not merely a well-behaved stepchild" (Kilic, 157). The importance of the
desire to be a full-fledged member of the West was so strong that one scholar has
even claimed that " . . . Soviet pressures provided a lever by means of which Turks
could gain their ultimate goal: full acceptance by the West" (Tachau, 174).
With the coming of the Korean War the Turks were again given an
opportunity to prove their value to an international organization, the UN. The
Turkish government's decision to join the American led UN effort to turn back
communist aggression in Korea is widely understood as being motivated by the
Turkish presumption that Turkish participation would enhance Turkey's bid for
NATO membership (Ahmad, 391). Prime Minister Menderes immediately sent
troops to participate in the UN forces, finding a way to circumvent the normally slow
parliamentary procedures necessary to mobilize military forces (Ahmad, 391).
The Turks were not only to suffer the normal casualties of war, but also repercussions
at home. Bulgaria, being a member of the Communist Bloc, forced 250,000 Muslims
out of Bulgaria and into Turkey as an act of revenge for Turkey's participation in the
war (Zurcher, 248). Swamped with refugees, the Turkish government had to find a
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means to feed and house this mass of people who had just days before been Bulgarian
citizens.
The Turks had paid a heavy price for joining the UN effort to contain
communist aggression in Korea, but their participation was not in vain because the
Turks realized their long coveted objective when they became full members of NATO
in 1952. NATO membership, however, did not sate the Turkish need for Western
affiliation. The Turks felt that membership in more organizations would bind them
that much closer to the West. In 1953 the US asked Turkey to join Greece and
Yugoslavia in the Balkan Pact with the idea of strengthening American influence in
the region. The Turks were glad to agree to this. A somewhat different outcome
resulted when the Turks invited the US to join the Baghdad Pact [later known as the
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)], a collective security treaty that included
Turkey, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. (G. Harris, 1972: 64). The Turks were
unsuccessful in this invitation, for while the US maintained bases in Turkey, it agreed
only to sign an agreement of cooperation with Turkey and refused to enter the Pact.
This incident reflected a trend in Turkish-American relations in which the Turks
acquiesced to American requests but Americans did not respond in kind when the
Turks came with similar requests. This trend developed because the, ''Turks had
never really analyzed the nature and limits of this friendship critically" (Erden, 94).
The Turkish inability to realistically understand the nature of its relationship with the
US was symptomatic of Turkey's needs for affiliation with the West.
This trend became more marked in 1957 when NATO decided to install
medium range atomic Jupiter missiles in Western Europe. While many of the
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Western European countries had been uneasy about nuclear weapons on their soil, the
Turks " . . . had been almost alone in their enthusiasm for stationing missiles on Turkish
territory" (G. Harris 1972: 92). Also in 1957, the Turks directed attention to the
danger of neighboring Syria falling under communism and massed troops on the
Syrian border. It was unlikely that the Turkish troops would cross the border even if
communist elements had succeeded in taking control of the Syrian government, and it
seems more likely that the Turks' ". . .intention was to was to dramatize the issue
before the world and indicate, especially to the United States, that Turkey would fully
support some kind of intervention . . . if the United States decided upon such a move"
(Lenczowski, 145). Once again, the Turks were acting enthusiastically in support of
the goals of the Western Alliance to the possible detriment of its own interests as each
time the Turks supported Western interests in the Middle East it drew the ire of
Turkey's Islamic neighbors. For the Turks, NATO membership meant not only
support from the Western powers for Turkey, but also a readiness to make the foreign
policy goals of the Western Powers Turkey's own (Erden, 44).
This was reflected not only in matters regarding the immediate defense of
Europe, as installation of the Jupiters demonstrated, but also in Turkey's policies
toward developing countries around the world. Instead of acting in support of Third
World countries that might aspire to the dignity that Turkey had achieved in winning
its revolution in the early 1920s, Turkey sought to continually prove its affiliation
with the Western powers and thereby undermine the hopes of Third World countries
that found themselves in confrontation with the First World. Instead of supporting its
Islamic neighbors in their struggles against the colonial powers, Turkey favored the
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British cause in Egypt and the French in Algeria (Ahmad 1993: 119). When the
Indians invaded the Portuguese colony of Goa in late 1961, a colony that was located
on Indian soil, the Turks were quick to join the US and Great Britain in sponsoring a
UN resolution demanding the withdrawal of Indian troops (Erden, 63). Similarly,
even after the cooling in relations with the US caused by the Johnson letter, in the late
sixties the Turks voted against the PRC's request to enter the UN and supported the
disarmament goals of the Western powers (Erden, 130). These instances demonstrate
the continuance of the pattern of strong Turkish affiliation with Western based
international organizations.
Simply put, after the Second World War, the Turks increasingly ". . . predicated
their entire foreign policy on faith in commitments from their allies. Various Turkish
governments had gone to great lengths to cooperate with their alliance partners, even
beyond formal treaty obligations" (Harris 1975: 60). A major reason that the Turks
put such emphasis on these commitments was that they were culturally disposed
affiliate with the countries of a successful an established civilization and the twentieth
century manifestation of this disposition was Turkish penchant for seeking
membership in Western based international organizations.
The specific case to be analyzed in Chapter VI, the Turkish-American
confrontation over Cyprus in 1964, represents another instance in this pattern. The
Turkish government under Prime Minister Ismet Inonu announced that they would
invade Cyprus for the purpose of aiding Turkish Cypriots who were involved in a
civil conflict with Greek Cypriots. U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, fearing that the
Greeks would react to this Turkish invasion by also becoming involved militarily,
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thus leading to a war between two members of NATO, communicated that if the
Turks did invade the U.S. and other NATO countries would not be responsible if the
Soviets took advantage of the situation and moved against Turkey. Upon receiving
this communication, Inonu immediately abandoned the plans for invasion. While
there are competing reasons as to why the Turks made the decision that they did, a
compelling case can be made that this cultural pattern of affiliation with Western
international organizations was a factor that caused the Turks to call of the invasion
of Cyprus. The events surrounding this episode, the possible influences on decision
making, and statements by Prime Minister Inonu will be analyzed in Chapter IV for
the purpose of shedding light on the decision and why it was affected by cultural
factors.

Conclusion
The Turkish experience in the world demonstrates the importance of earlier
conditioning. As defined in the Chapter II, culture is a product of group response to
the physical or social environment. During the middle of the first millennium A.D.
the Turks began to move westward across central Asia. Instead of occurring in a
single place over time, Turkish history took place in different locations. Unlike most
national societies, the Turks were not permanent members of a regional civilization.
No one questions whether the French are European or the Koreans are Asian , but the
Turks do not easily fit into a civilizational category. This circumstance forced the
Turks do seek security and membership within different civilizations at different
times. Earlier migration conditioned the Turks to look for physical and social
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security within strong civilizations. This need for affiliation with strong and superior
civilizations became an important Turkish cultural trait.
This is evidenced in Turkish behavior during the Ottoman period and during
the twentieth century. After wandering across Central Asia and experimenting with
other ethnic and national groups, the Turks enthusiastically joined the Islamic
movement that became the Ottoman Empire, submerging their national identity more
than any other group within the empire. While the Turks were militarily strong, they
always looked to the Arabs and Persians as the societies that originated the religion
and culture of Islam. Following the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, rather than
supporting the independence of the Arabs and Persians from the Western colonial
powers, the Turks enthusiastically supported the foreign policies of European powers.
During the Cold War, the Turks were uninhibited in their solicitation of American
friendship and attempted to become members of any international organization that
was supported by the US and Western Europe. While the Turks attached themselves
to different civilizations at different times, the role that they played within those
civilizations was similar, always trying to do a little more to show their allegiance.
Thus, the cultural trait of seeking membership in and approval from states within an
advanced civilization grew out of centuries old experience and continued to affect the
way that Turkey operated in the world during the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER V
CHINA AND THE WORLD
BEFORE AND AFTER WESTERN
INTERVENTION

The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate how Chinese foreign policy
decision-making during the period from the establishment of the People's Republic of
China (PRC) until the end of the Cold War was influenced by the combined effects of
Chinese culture and the international social environment during this time. This
chapter, therefore, serves a similar function to the preceding chapter on Turkey, in
that it provides the context for the analysis of the Chinese decision to go to war with
Vietnam in 1979 in Chapter VI. The specific aspect of Chinese culture to be
examined is China's traditional feeling of cultural superiority toward other states. In
the following sections how this feeling of cultural superiority developed among
Chinese, how it has evolved, and how it has affected foreign policy during the
twentieth century will be discussed. Also, as in Chapter IV, other aspects of Chinese
culture (There are many which have received a great amount of attention.) that are not
pertinent to this study will not be discussed.
The geographic, historical, and cultural circumstances of China stand in
marked contrast to those of Turkey. An important initial observation is that East Asia
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developed in relative isolation from the rest of the world, leading to distinctive
cultural patterns which have been retained for thousands of years (Reischauer and
Fairbank 1960; Bianco 1971). Concerning China specifically, those persons
speaking the Chinese language have inhabited North China, the original home of East
Asian civilization, from the time of the earliest historical record, and have expanded
into other regions such as Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang (Reischauer and
Fairbank 1960: 8). There is no record of an ancient hero who led the Chinese to East
Asia, and it is assumed by the Chinese that they have always inhabited East Asia
(Butterfield, 24-25). The Chinese language has also been instrumental in maintaining
Chinese culture in that it is fundamentally different from Western languages, leading
one experienced observer of Chinese culture to comment that, ''The introduction of
new concepts into Chinese is like putting new wine into old bottles; the wine is often
somewhat changed, if not spoiled" (Clubb 1978: 302). These circumstances have
caused Chinese to believe in the essential distinctiveness and superiority of their
culture.

China and the World Before 1 949
This sense of superiority was reinforced by the fact that China was larger,
richer, and intellectually more advanced than its neighbors (Harris, 120). This
enabled China to maintain influence over these smaller countries on her borders.
Some, like Korea, could be taken militarily. Others, such as Japan and Vietnam,
which could not be subdued by force, nevertheless stood in awe of China and
demonstrated this by their enduring efforts to absorb and implement Chinese ways. If
88

other countries acknowledged China's greatness, why should the Chinese themselves
question it?
This had been the case since before the time of Christ. Beginning during the

. . . second and first millennia B.C, for the non-Chinese tribes of
what is now central and southern China and for the nomads of
the northern steppes, Chinese culture was the sole representative
of a way of life based on intensive agriculture, towns, and ordered
large-scale government. As such it impressed the uncivilized
neighbors of the Chinese, even when they raided and plundered
it, and the discovery by the Chinese that their cultural prestige
could be used diplomatically to tame barbarians who could not
be crushed by military power was certainly one of the sources of
the idea, so prominent in traditional Chinese philosophy, that the
successful ruler was one who attracted people to his 'virtue'
instead of subduing them by force (Hudson, 340-34 1).
Related to this conception was the Chinese idea that u_se of force was a threat to
political order and that civilians were better disposed to be effective rulers (Kracke,
Jr., 333).
The correctness of this system was confirmed both formally and informally by
the smaller states in East Asia. The rulers of these countries came to the Chinese
court to receive the seal of office from the Chinese emperor, and this added to their
prestige and justified their rule within their respective countries (Michael and Taylor,
53). All of the countries that came to the Chinese court had to pay tribute to China,
therefore, acknowledging Chinese superiority. This tribute system became the
method by which Chinese emperors dealt with foreign governments (Fairbank 1969:
25). Concerning manners and etiquette, throughout East Asia the use of chopsticks,
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first used in China, conferred upon the individual who possessed this ability the air of
civilization (Hudson, 342).
Occasionally, of course, those states bordering the Middle Kingdom did
undertake successful military invasions of China, but this did not cause the Chinese to
doubt their place in the world. This is because even those that conquered China
inevitably were overcome by Chinese culture. In the fourth century, the Toba Tatars
successfully invaded northern China, but by the end of the fifth century ". . . their
emperors had prohibited the use of their own language and ordered all their people to
adopt the Chinese tongue, Chinese customs, and Chinese dress" (Bloodworth, 345).
The Mongols and the Manchus undertook the most serious foreign invasions,
in the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively. The Mongols began their
reign over China in 1279, and they quickly incorporated many Chinese traditions into
their governmental procedures, including court ceremonies, Confucian rites,
employing Confucian advisors, and even setting up an office to write the history of
previous dynasties (a task that each new Chinese dynasty had carried out) (Roberts,
108). Native Chinese were initially uncomfortable with the Mongol conquest, and
because they outnumbered the Mongols, were able to make many demands on the
Mongol administration. During their ninety years of power in China, the Mongols
became increasingly sinicized, and this trend began to accelerate during the second
half of the dynasty (Roberts, 1 16). Although the Mongol rulers, later known as the
Yuan Dynasty, made great efforts to accommodate the population, they were
eventually overcome by a native group of Han Chinese, the Ming Dynasty, in 1368.
Despite the fact that they had driven the Mongols out of China, the Ming emperors
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continued to fear that the Mongols would again invade. This caused the Ming to
withdraw from the world and concentrate on northern border defense (Fairbank 1992:
139). Even so, " . . . as time went on, the Ming shed their anti-Mongol animosities and
saw themselves as the heirs of the Yuan within China and beyond" (Adshead, 1 76).
While the Mongols never regained sufficient strength to launch another
invasion of China, another group from the north moved southward and invaded Ming
China. The Manchus swept down from the northeast in 1644 and overcame all of
China shortly thereafter. Although the Manchus maintained some of the their
customs such as forcing men to wear the queue, they began adapting some of their
customs even before they initiated the invasion of China. During the 1630s, they
reorganized their civil administration along Chinese lines (Fairbank, 1992: 147).
Once in power, Manchu emperors subscribed to the traditional Chinese tributary
system, involving the granting of commercial rights to other states in exchange for
their acknowledgement of Chinese cultural superiority (Roberts, 156). These
instances caused the conquered Chinese to believe that whether they resisted military
intervention or not, others would still realize the superiority of the Chinese. One
scholar characterized the situation as one in which " . . . the whole Chinese attitude has,
in the past, been one of 'if we bring them into our country, if we treat them in the
right way, they will recognize, they will acknowledge the virtues of our civilization
and they will become sinicized as a result of it "' (Harris, 12 1-22).
The Chinese took this attitude towards both their neighbors in East Asia and
states in other parts of the world and, just as neighboring states were dazzled by the
Chinese, initially so were the first Europeans who visited or read about China. Marco
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Polo' s travels in China during the thirteenth century were well publicized throughout
Europe, and he wrote of cities much larger than any in Europe and concluded that the
manners and ethical behavior of the Chinese were of a higher level than those found
in Europe (Hart, 130). In the next four centuries more Europeans visited China,
primarily missionaries. Occasionally the Chinese engaged these foreigners for
specific purposes such as when (1644) the Jesuit priest Adam Schall was given a
minor government appointment in China, but these appointments were few because
before this China " . . . secure in her superiority, had never dreamed that anything of
value might be found in the West" (Spence, 4 ).
By the early sixteenth century Portuguese trade ships came to Southeastern
China, with the Spanish, Dutch, and English following over the next two hundred
years. The Chinese compelled these "outer barbarians" to formally submit to the
Chinese emperor as the ruler of mankind and promised them that if they behaved
correctly they would be treated in a generous manner (Clyde and Beers, 64).
Regarding treatment of the traders in the ports that they visited, they were treated
cordially but, "Judging by Chinese regulations and proclamations, Europeans were
considered to be of a lower order of moral being than the natives and were so treated"
(Vinacke, 33).
During the 1600s and 1700s, Europeans began to import porcelain and other
artistic products from China on a larger scale, and this " . . . deeply affected the
aesthetic sensibility of Europe in that age" (Hudson, 350). At about this time
Europeans also became interested in Chinese ideas of government (Kracke, Jr., 335).
Europeans who were looking for a model of a benevolent monarchy believed that
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China was nearer to this ideal than any of the European governments, and French
economists used China as an example to justify their theories (Franz and Taylor, 9).
These attitudes only served to confirm China's sense of cultural superiority.
The French Revolution marked a major change in European thought and
strongly influenced both economics and politics for the next century. Europeans no
longer regarded unconstitutional monarchical rule as an ideal type of government, and
they believed states that were governed solely by kings or emperors to be backward.
The leading European powers, now much more powerful than countries on all other
continents, began to arrive in Asia in force demanding trade concessions. As
described above, Europeans had formerly been cordial toward China, and the first
Western diplomatic missions to China resulted in accordance with Chinese wishes,
but this was to change with the coming of the nineteenth century and the arrival of
British power in East Asia.
The Chinese court's common procedure for receiving foreign diplomatic
missions was to compel foreign representatives to kotow before the Chinese emperor
in acknowledgement of Chinese superiority, and the Chinese assumed that all
countries from the far west would perceive Chinese greatness just as other Asian
countries had. When Lord Macartney arrived in Beijing in 1793 with the goal of
establishing trade relations between the British and Chinese empires, he was brought
to the palace and asked to kotow. He subsequently refused, although the Chinese
decided to record that Macartney had indeed kotowed before the Son of Heaven
(Teng and Fairbank, 20). This marked the beginning, from the Chinese point of view,
of Western intransigence. From a historical perspective, it can be understood as the
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beginning of China' s painful process of modernization. In the words of John King
Fairbank, it marked the tragedy of the Chinese state, in that " . . . her adjustment to the
barbarians of Inner Asia was such poor preparation for contact with the modern
West" (Fairbank 1969: 25).
During the following decades, the Chinese continued to believe that after
sufficient exposure to the Chinese world, the British would come to understand
Chinese greatness. The British, on the other hand, decided that if China could not be
persuaded to open its markets, it would have to be coerced. The result of this
divergence of views was the Opium War of 1 840-4 1 . Largely because of their
immense technological advantage, the British won an easy victory and forced the
Chinese to grant concessions in cities such as Hong Kong and Shanghai among
others. Once the British victory became known, other powers decided that they must
act quickly to get their share. The French also successfully forced the Chinese to
grant concessions in Amoy and Shanghai.
One scholar, commenting on China' s traditional feeling of superiority and the
difference in Chinese and Japanese responses to Western intervention, states that
" . . . China reacted differently because of her almost complete defenselessness; here
there was no aggressive tradition, probably just on account of this feeling of
superiority" (Romein, 56). By centuries end, Japan had learned not only to deflect
Western intentions but to act the same way as Western countries. Japan intervened
in China and proceeded to defeat China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1 894-95, leading
to the Japanese acquisition of Taiwan. Clearly, the ancient philosophy of the Chinese
had to be modified, but how?
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Despite the many setbacks China suffered at the hands of Western powers
beginning in the early nineteenth century, the idea of China's greatness was never
totally eradicated. This argument has been advanced by many who have studied
China during the twentieth century. According to Teng and Fairbank, the Chinese
leadership during the period between the Opium War and the inception of the Chinese
Communist Party maintained an ethnocentric outlook (3). It was difficult to pursue
policies that reflected this ethnocentrism, however, for several reasons. First, as
related above, the shock of being subjected to invasion and intimidation from powers
that did not acknowledge Chinese superiority led to much confusion about how to
solve the problem. Also, the Chinese simply did not have the military power to eject
the Western powers that had humiliated China. Finally, during the era of Nationalist
(Guomindang) power (1911-1949) the government could not fully exploit the
nation's resources because it controlled only a portion of the country. The remaining
part was under the control of various warlords, the communists, or the Japanese.

Foreign Policy of the PRC
To understand the international outlook of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) one must first understand the conditions under which the Chinese Communist
Party came into being and took power. Although China was not a combatant in the
First World War, it had sent workers to France to assist the Allies in tasks that did not
involve actual fighting. Following the war, China had pressed the delegates of the
Versailles Peace Conference to restore territory in Shandong Province to Chinese
sovereignty. This territory had been under German control before 1914 but was taken
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by the Japanese early in the war. China petitioned the delegates at Versailles to
declare that the Japanese must abandon all claims in Shandong. Instead of granting
the Chinese requests the Versailles delegates awarded the Shandong territory to the
Japanese for their active participation against Germany during the war.
This rebuff caused outrage in China, beginning with student demonstrations
on May 4, 1919. Commercial strikes, boycott movements, and worker
demonstrations followed the initial student demonstrations. China had placed its
hopes in President Wilson's plan for international justice and been bitterly
disappointed. Rather than seizing on the current of anti-Japanese and anti-foreign
feeling, the Guomindang government hesitated because they wanted to maintain good
relations with Japan in order to obtain international loans (Cheseneaux, Le Barbier,
and Bergere, 100). It was in this atmosphere that the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) held its first meeting in the summer of 1920.
While the Chinese Communists were unquestionably interested in bringing
about radical change in Chinese domestic politics, domestic politics could not be
divorced from China's international situation. This became increasingly apparent
when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931. The Guomindang government's
response to Japanese was half hearted at best. The Guomindang was more concerned
with the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and only when this was
accomplished would they tum all of their efforts against the Japanese. The
Communists, on the other hand, constant} y advocated that a war of resistance against
Japan must be the foremost national priority and that this war was inevitable (Snow,
447).
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When the Japanese widened the war and moved into China proper in the
summer of 1937 the Guomindang and the Communists negotiated a temporary
settlement and joined forces in a common effort to eject the Japanese. However, once
again the Guomindang effort was something less than it could have been. When the
Japanese took Shanghai in 1938, Chiang Kai-shek sacrificed his his best armies there
even though he thought victory was impossible. He did thi s because he thought that
the international press coverage of the battle would provoke other countries to
intervene on China' s behalf (Tuchman 197 1 : 169). During the years that followed
Chiang exhibited more concern for maintaining his own power than defeating the
Japanese, constantly refusing to accept American proposals that would strengthen
Guomindang armies but would also strengthen potential challengers to Chiang's own
rule (Tsou, 1 1 1 -1 1 2).
The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, made a concerted effort to fight
the Japanese. While not winning any major battles against the Japanese, the
Communists were successful in using guerilla tactics to harass Japanese forces and
defeat them in minor engagements. This caused many Chinese to believe that the
CCP's People' s Liberation Army (PLA) was a major force in defeating the Japanese
invaders (Uhalley, 62). Whether this was based in fact is irrelevant. What is
important is that the Communists established a reputation among the Chinese masses
for aggressively opposing foreign powers trying to intervene in China. That the CCP
would strongly oppose foreign intervention strengthened the legitimacy of the CCP's
claim that it deserved to be the sole power in China. This, among other reasons,
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persuaded many Chinese to support the Communist effort against the Guomindang
when the Chinese Civil War resumed following the end of World War II.
After the Communists won victory in 1949, the Chinese mainland was once
again united under one government. The new leadership was free to make statements
and policies without intervention from foreign powers. These statements and policies
exhibited, albeit in an altered form, the ancient idea of China' s distinctiveness and
superiority. Mao wasted no time in expressing his thoughts on China' s position in the
world. When he mounted the Tiananmen Gate to proclaim the founding of the
People's Republic on October 1 , 1949, he stated, "Our nation will never again be an
insulted nation . . . our revolution has gained the sympathy and acclamation of the
broad masses throughout the world . . . we will emerge in the world as a nation with a
high culture" (Schram, 1 10). Mao' s words indicated that China still believed in its
own greatness, but instead of seeking to demonstrate its higher culture to others by
letting them come to China and realize Chinese superiority, the Chinese intended to
demonstrate it through force of arms.
In one sense, the basic goal of Chinese foreign policy during the period
between the establishment of the PRC and the end of the Cold War was not dissimilar
from that of other states. This basic goal was the protection of territorial integrity.
However, the Chinese conception of how to achieve this goal was intertwined with
the Chinese historic conception of China' s place in the world. Historically, strong
Chinese dynasties had attempted to culturally dominate bordering states in their
efforts to insure the security of the Chinese state that might be threatened by
culturally inferior foreigners. Now, however, this traditional outlook was
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strengthened as it became fused with the idea of forceful Marxist opposition to
international imperialism and a new sense of Western style nationalism (Latourette,
388). The product of these influences was a Chinese foreign policy that integrated
territorial defense with a desire to become the most revolutionary of the world's
communist states (Fairbank, Reishauer, and Craig, 879). This was reinforced by the
fact that the senior members of the Communist government had more military and
combat experience than the upper level leaderships of all other governments in the
world (Powell, 347).
This meant that China's concept of the maintenance of territorial integrity
differed substantially from that of other states. If during the past century the Chinese
had permitted the Russians, French, British, and Japanese to enter their territory with
the hope that these foreigners would realize the superiority of Chinese culture once
they were exposed to it, now the Chinese would be especially vigilant concerning all
possibilities of foreign incursion and related border questions (Camilleri, 22).
Ironically, Mao's most well known idea pertaining to national defense, the
concept of the "People's War," was defensive in nature and inappropriate for the type
of border disputes that China became repeatedly involved in during the Cold War.
Particularly suitable for a large country with a massive population, the strategy of
People's War was to be implemented by allowing an invading army to progress deep
into Chinese territory and thus, overextend itself. Then the Chinese civilian militia
under the leadership of the People's Liberation Army would overwhelm the invaders
from all directions. While this line of thinking was a natural progression in thought
from Mao's ideas on guerilla warfare and a useful strategy for total war, it was
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useless in situations where foreign countries made limited attacks or used the threat of
military force to extract concessions.
Therefore, a strategy was needed that could match lower level threats and
demonstrate China' s commitment to violent revolution. Although Mao did not write
about specific procedures to counter limited threats, a clear pattern emerged in the
Chinese responses to these threats during the Cold War (Gurtov and Hwang, 256258). This pattern involved Chinese recognition of a perceived threat, and then the
undertaking of a pre-emptive attack that would be followed by either a pause for
negotiations or a prompt Chinese withdrawal. The desired effect was to show
probable aggressors that China had gained the initiative, or as in the case of the Sino
Indian and Sino-Vietnamese border conflicts, to "teach the enemy a lesson." The
dynamic and offensive nature of these pre-emptive strikes was not unrelated to the
ideological stance that the PRC had adopted. Marxist ideology meshed well with the
Chinese need to express their historic greatness and assuage their bruised pride that
stemmed from Chinese humiliation by the colonial powers during the previous
decades. The revolutionary nature of communist ideology places a strong emphasis
on the positive consequences of war (Camilleri, 24), and this was readily translated
into action in many instances by the PRC when opportunities presented themselves.
On other occasions the Chinese did not act militarily but employed combative
rhetoric suggesting that China would welcome conflict if the opposition wanted to do
battle.
With the onset of the Korean War in 1950, the Chinese were quickly given an
opportunity to prove their mettle. When U.S. troops drove up the Korean peninsula
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toward the Chinese border, Mao ordered hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops
into action. The decision to intervene in Korea was a considerable gamble.
According to Allen Whiting ( 1960), the risks that China incurred included the
possibility of the US Air Force bombing north China, the possibility of American
assisted Nationalist Chinese landing on the mainland to reignite the civil war, delayed
admission to the United Nations, indefinite postponement of the PRC' s invasion of
Taiwan, and the further draining of Chinese resources that had been nearly exhausted
in the previous two decades of civil and anti-Japanese warfare. Nevertheless, the
Chinese did intervene, possibly " . . . because a military clash between Communist
China and the United States was inevitable because of the ideological component in
Peking's foreign policy and the quest for greatness which had always been deeply
imbedded in Chinese history and culture and which was reactivated by a revived
sense of power and unity after a century of humiliation and defeat" (Tsou, 588).
Rather than being an isolated incident, the Korean War marked a trend of
conflict in Asia between the Chinese and Americans. China confronted the United
States over Taiwan and the offshore islands that the Nationalists still possessed,
Quemoy and Matsu, several other times ( 1954 and 1958) during the decade. While
these actions might have appeared risky to some, the Chinese felt that the risks
involved were acceptable because they were able to demonstrate that they could not
be bullied by a superpower (Zhang, 282).
During the 1960s this trend continued. When the United States began to
dramatically escalate American involvement in Vietnam in the late summer of 1965,
the Johnson Administration warned China not to interfere and that if China did so the
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United States would not hesitate to launch attacks against targets on Chinese soil (as
the U.S. had not done in the Korean War). China refused to be intimidated by the
threat and escalated the rhetorical battle by reminding the US that it now too
possessed atomic weapons (Zagoria 1967: 77-78).
While positioning itself as the chief foe of the United States and the Western
imperialism that it represented was a substantial element of Chinese foreign policy,
the Chinese also had no shortage of conflicts with enemies closer to home. In 1962
the Chinese became involved in a month long border war with India over a disputed
area on the Aksai Chin plateau. Indian forces had advanced into· the largely
uninhabited area after the Chinese, claiming that this area was a part of Tibet, had
constructed a road in the region. In October the People's Liberation Army launched
an attack with vastly superior forces and drove the Indians back to the line that China
claimed was the true border. The Chinese then pulled their forces out of the disputed
area. This incident demonstrated that the Chinese behaved somewhat consistently in
regard to border questions. No matter whether they faced superior or inferior forces,
the Chinese acted to control the conflict by being the first to initiate and also break off
hostilities.
From the time of Krushchev's 1956 speech denunciating Stalin the ideological
bonds that held China and the USSR together began to weaken. Mao saw
Krushchev's change of emphasis as an attempt at revisionism within the Marxist
camp. Mao's plans for rapid economic growth, as exemplified by the Great Leap
Forward, deviated strongly from the Soviet model. During the early 1960s all Soviet
technicians in China were recalled and the rift grew wider. One scholar, seeing the
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commonality in China's increasingly independent and aggressive path and the
behavior of China's imperial past, wrote that during this period, " . . . by striking out on
her own, by supporting policies with her economic, military, and ideological
resources, China sought to regain a diplomatic initiative that had been lost more than
a century before" (Clyde and Beers, 444). As the ideological bickering between
Moscow and Beijing increased, two traditional issues of power politics, allies and
borders, also became areas of contention for the two foremost communist states.
The Sino-Indian border confrontation further aggravated relations between the
two communist giants. The Soviets developed increasingly friendly relations with
India during the period and began supplying India with military aircraft in 1962.
When the Chinese launched their reprisal in Aksai Chin, the Soviets refused to
support either side and called for a cease-fire. As the Soviets were trying to establish
stronger relations with India at the time, surely they found the attack undesirable, yet
they made no direct response toward the Chinese. In 1965, China once again
threatened India over the border issue, and this time the Soviets openly responded in a
negative way toward China (Day, 65).
Of a much more serious concern to the Soviets were the several border
disputes that the USSR itself had with the PRC. During the middle and late 1960s
there was a continual war of words emanating from both parties concerning
boundaries in Xinjiang and Manchuria. Both states began to concentrate troops along
the disputed border areas. Although some small scale fighting took place in 1963,
neither country publicized these incidents. That tensions continued to stay at a high
level through the rest of the decade was demonstrated by the Chinese effort to
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construct an underground city below Beijing that would serve as a shelter for party
leaders in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack. On March 2, 1969 the simmering
conflict finally erupted in a border clash on Damansky (Chen Pao) Island in the
Ussuri River, the Mancurian boundary line. Apparently, a numerically superior
Chinese forced initiated an attack on a Soviet border patrol and the Soviets suffered
heavy casualties (Clubb 1971: 500).
On March 15 a larger confrontation took place in the same area. Each side
charged the other with initiating hostilities but, once again, it seems likely that the
Chinese attacked first, launching mortar and artillery attacks on what they believed to
be a numerically inferior Russian force (Clubb 1971: 501). Instead of being taken by
surprise, the Soviets were ready this time and opened a fierce counterattack
employing artillery and aircraft. Some 800 Chinese were killed while the Soviets
only lost sixty dead. After this encounter both armies side returned to their respective
sides of the river and their governments began attempts to settle the border dispute
diplomatically.
The border clashes on the Manchurian border reflected the extent to which the
Sino-Soviet relationship had deteriorated. Just as the Chinese believed themselves to
be in great power competition with the imperialist United States, they also became
involved in great power competition with the Soviet Union, their erstwhile
communist ally. Gradually, the notion within China that the USSR was the senior
communist state and China was an important and populous but still junior partner had
crumbled. This was due to the fact that:
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China's history, culture, world view, its size and population, all
served to inculcate the expectation that China could be no less
than a partner. She might willingly· concede a pioneering status
to the Soviet Union. And she might therefore wish, seek, and even
expect, as birthright, to be able to draw on the economic and
military power of the Soviet Union. But there could be no question
of anything less than equal potential (Jacobsen, 53).
The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 represents another instance in this pattern.
When Vietnam attempted to bring all of Indochina under its control in the late 1970s,
China objected and threatened war. Vietnam's primary ally, the Soviet Union,
threatened to attack China in the event of a Chinese attack on Vietnam. China would
not be cowed and launched an invasion of Vietnam anyway. While the Soviets did
not carry out their threats and the Chinese retreated after a month of hostilities, this
does not change the fact that China undertook serious risks to demonstrate that it
could not be bullied by anyone, even a superpower.

The next chapter will provide a

more in depth discussion of the risks involved in this decision.

Conclusion
Just as Turkey was forced to trade one set of allies for another during the early
twentieth century, China was forced to change the way it pursued its foreign policy
objectives. However, in both cases the transition was based on a larger continuity.
The Turks continued to define their foreign policy goals by placing the interests of the
their allies above their own, while the Chinese continued to attempt to show the world
that they were one of the great powers. The violent nature of international politics in
the twentieth century meant that China must abandon its pacific methods of asserting
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great power status and adopt violent and aggressive measures to demonstrate that
China was indeed a great power.
This has been recognized by many scholars of Chinese politics and history.
One scholar who spent time in China during this period provides the following
description the communist leadership's attitude toward foreign policy:

In all their actions the Chinese leaders are goaded by a relentless drive
for power status for China. China must be the equal of the United States
and the Soviet Union and Great Britain. It must possess the authority
that belongs to a Great Power. If there are some who do not believe so,
they shall be made to believe it. If some Great Power is not ready to treat
China as an equally Great Power, then it must be taught a lesson and
made to do so. No sacrifice is too great, no effort too costly to
achieve this status" (Dutt, 29).

Other scholars who studied China during this period have come to similar
conclusions. In his 1968 study of Chinese politics, Lucian Pye comments that, ''The
most pervasive underlying Chinese emotion is a profound, unquestioned, generally
unshakable identification with historical greatness" (50). Similarly, Robert Elegant
finds that although Mao attempted to strip away many ancient cultural Chinese
conventions, he was successful in gaining and maintaining power in China because,
"Mao was the creature of an overwhelming compulsion to return China to her rightful
place among the nations --- at their head." (1968: 20) This remains true in the post
Mao era, with faith in China's greatness being among the most important beliefs of
Chinese foreign policy (Oksenberg 1999: 301).
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CHAPTER VI
COMPARING DECISIONS UNDER
CONDITIONS OF IMMEDIATE
EXTENDED DETERRENCE

Two instances of decision-making in situations of immediate extended
deterrence will be compared in this chapter. There are two principal reasons that
these cases have been chosen. First, while many of the cases included in lists of
immediate extended deterrence encounters( Huth and Russett 1984; 1988) are
questionable, these two cases have been defined as being legitimate cases even by
those who doubt the concept of immediate extended deterrence (Lebow and Stein
1988). The definition of immediate extended deterrence, as iterated in Chapter I, is a
situation in which state A seeks to deter state B from attacking state C. The second
reason that these cases have been chosen is that it is not unanimously clear as to why
the countries that were the object of deterrence, Turkey and China, made the
decisions that they did.
The preceding chapters have outlined the importance of national culture, how
national culture adapts to changing international social conditions, and two examples
of how this process works, Turkey and China. This chapter will provide a focused
comparison of how their different evolutionary cultural processes affected Turkish
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and Chinese foreign policy decision-making under circumstances of immediate
extended deterrence. This does not imply that Turkey and China are equal or
unequal, only that their leaders had to make decisions under similar circumstances.
These circumstances included not only being the object of deterrence in an immediate
extended deterrence encounter, but also being the object of deterrence in situations in
which the country seeking to deter was a superpower.

The Cyprus Crisis of 1964
The island of Cyprus is located very near the southern coast of Turkey in the
Mediterranean Sea, and its population is composed of Greek and Turkish ethnic
groups. During most of the nineteenth century Cyprus was ruled by the Ottoman
Turks, and then ceded to the British Empire. Greeks and Turks on Cyprus had
traditionally been at odds with one another, but British control may have served to
unite Greeks, who have historically believed that Cyprus was part of a "greater
Hellenic community," with the Turks in joint opposition to their overseers (Adams
and Cottrel, 7-8). This period of harmony between the two populations was to last
through much of the first half of the twentieth century, but the end of the Second
World War and the dissolution of the British Empire brought profound change to
Cyprus. In 1950 the British organized elections and many Greek Cypriots began to
champion the idea of enosis, a conception of cultural unity among all Greeks, which
became the central concept of the Greek nationalist movement on Cyprus. The
Turkish Cypriots' initial reaction was to remain allied to the Greek Cypriots in the
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effort to finally eject the British, but by the late 1950s the Turkish began to make
common cause with the British because of fears of a Greek dominated Cyprus.
In 1959, under the Zurich-London Agreements, Cyprus was given limited
independence with stipulations that minority rights would be upheld by the guarantor
powers of Turkey, Greece, and Great Britain. The Cypriot constitution outlined that
the first president would be a Greek, that the vice-president would be a Turk, and that
the House of Representatives would be freely elected. It was hoped that this
arrangement would encourage Greeks and Turks on Cyprus to cooperate, but instead
it only brought about stalemate. In the fall of 1963, led by President Makarios, Greek
Cypriots began to campaign for changes in the constitution, claiming that under
present circumstances the majority could not rule effectively. These requested
changes amounted to a denial of rights to Cypriot Turks, and limited violence broke
out between the two ethnic groups. Throughout the closing months of 1963 both
groups made efforts to arm themselves, and in December open fighting broke out
leading to a confrontation during Christmas week that left 300 dead.
On Christmas Eve of 1963 the guarantor powers made the decision to
intervene by asking Makarios to agree to a cease-fire. However, Makarios refused
this offer and fighting continued. The British then deployed troops in the capitol city
of Nicosia and established a neutral zone there, thereby slowing down the fighting to
a degree. At this point both ethnic groups began to support abandonment of the
constitution, with the Turks advocating partition of the island. British resources and
will began to run out, and they then asked the United States to step in and send
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supplies and also support the establishment of an international peacekeeping mission
composed of NATO country forces.
The United States had no desire to become involved (Ball, 350), yet it saw no
alternative and immediately began efforts to organize a NATO force. Makarios, who
was pursuing a nonalignment policy and was under Soviet pressure not to allow a
NATO mission in Cyprus (Cranshaw, 3), once again decided to rebuff the interested
Western party, this time the United States. This meant that the US would have to go
to the United Nations to gain support for a peacekeeping force, therefore giving the
Soviets some say in the matter. In March of 1964 this force (UNFICYP) began
operating in Cyprus, but it could not bring a complete stop to the fighting.
On March 13 the Turkish government stated that it would unilaterally
intervene by sending troops to Cyprus if the fighting did not cease. This was
followed by Makarios' decision to allow Greek Prime Minister Papandreau to send
Greek troops to the island for "protection" against a Turkish invasion. Throughout
April and May the fighting continued as Turkish Cypriots made protest to the UN,
and as Secretary General U Thant condemned the Greek Cypriots for escalating the
confrontation.
Although the Turks lacked landing craft and were inexperienced in
amphibious operations (Harris 1985: 1 88), by late spring it seemed certain that the
Turks would carry out the operation nevertheless (James, 1 06). Reports claimed that
this invasion was scheduled for June 6 (Kosut, 1 21 ). There is little question that
militarily, Turkey " . . . had ample power to achieve a settlement in Cyprus according to
her own wishes" (Bilge, 16 1). Fearing imminent Turkish action that would lead to
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the first war ever between NATO members, a war which could potentially provoke
Soviet intervention, in June American President Lyndon Johnson sent Turkish
President Inonu a letter stating that " . . . your NATO allies have not had a chance to
consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union
if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention, without the full consent
and understanding of its NATO allies" (Ball, 35 1). Johnson also reminded Inonu that
the US and Turkey had agreed in 1947 that Turkey would not use any weapons
furnished by the United States for reasons other than those stipulated at the time the
weapons were provided (Ahmad 1977: 406). In reaction to what was to become
known as the Johnson letter, the Turks immediately cancelled plans for an invasion of
Cyprus.
This decision to cancel the Cyprus invasion by Turkish Prime Minister Inonu
conforms to the pattern of Turkish behavior discussed in Chapter IV, and represents
the most dramatic instance of the Turkish desire to be affiliated with the Western
powers and as a result, agreeing to their suggestions. Most accounts of the Turkish
decision discuss the Johnson letter and the immediate response by the Turks but do
not specifically declare why the Turks reacted as they did. This study seeks to put
forward an answer to this question, the answer being that the Turkish need for
affiliation with the West precluded a direct refusal of the American request. To
completely understand this answer, the nature and seriousness of the American threat,
and the Soviet threat upon which it was based, must first be evaluated. Only after
considering these respective threats can the Turkish decision and the explanation for
that decision offered here be completely understood.
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The American threat was certainly made with the goal of deterring Turkish
intervention on Cyprus, but it was only a threat in contingency. The contingency, of
course, was a Soviet invasion of Turkey. At the time, a Soviet move against Turkey
or any other state in Western Europe was unlikely. At the time the Soviets hadn't
attempted direct militarily intervention in any state outside of the Communist Bloc,
and would only do so once during the entire Cold War. Rather than become directly
involved in disputes of this nature, it was the nature of the Soviets to maintain a low
profile while providing aid to the party it favored (Hosmer and Wolfe, 1 55-1 56).
That the Soviets were unlikely to invade in the event of a Turkish invasion
was demonstrated several months after the Johnson letter. In August of 1964
Makarios sent his forces to attack Turkish-Cypriot villages and the Turks responded
by sending the Turkish air force to strafe Makarios' troops. Following the Turkish air
attack, Makarios requested Soviet intervention and was rejected (Cohen, 284-285).
The air strikes were stopped when the UN Security Council asked for a ceasefire.
Inonu iterated that " . . .in order to reconfirm Turkey's respect for the United Nations,
his government had decided to stop the actions of the Turkish air force over Cyprus"
(Tamkoc, 275). In September, and in keeping with their traditional method of acting
in this type of situation, the Soviets did agree to provide Makarios with anti-aircraft
weapons, but may also have sought to assure the Turks that these weapons would not
be used offensively against them (Wynfred and Gibert, 22).
As unlikely as Soviet intervention against Turkey was, the US was just as
unlikely to refuse to help Turkey if the Soviets did invade. During the 1964 Cyprus
crisis the US commanded much respect within NATO and was acting in the capacity
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of the leading member of NATO, but it certainly did not have the power to make
decisions without consulting other members. The decision to send a UN
peacekeeping force composed of NATO members had been a controversial issue
within NATO. Not just Turkey and Greece, but " . . . other NATO members were also
divided over Cyprus and the role NATO should play in resolving the ethnic conflict"
(Joseph, 87). If it was difficult for the US to garner support for its position to send a
peacekeeping force to Cyprus, how much more difficult would it have been for the
US to impose a NATO decision on other treaty members which both violated the law
and spirit of the treaty, not to mention jeopardizing the security of all Western
Europe. Beyond this, there is another simple and obvious reason that the US would
probably not carry out its threat against Turkey. By 1964, it had been for nearly two
decades the overarching goal of US foreign policy to keep the Soviets out of Western
Europe. While it is completely understandable that the US would use strong
measures to prevent a war between two members of the North Atlantic alli ance, it is
more than dubious that the US would forfeit the main goal of its foreign policy to
punish Turkey.
The second part of Johnson's threat, that Turkey had agreed not to use
weapons provided by the United States for any purposes other than defending Turkey
from Soviet attack, is questionable on two points. First, because Turkey already
possessed the weapons, they could do what they wanted with them and possibly
suffer no consequences. The importance of Turkey to US interests, as described
above, may have prevented the US from cutting off military aid. On the other hand,
the US could very well have discontinued military aid to Turkey, but the Turks could
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have bought weapons elsewhere. While it might have been more expensive, the
Turks could have purchased weapons from other countries within the Atlantic
Alliance such as France and Holland, who have sold weapons to many other
countries. The impact of Johnson's threat to suspend aid was at least as strong in a
nonmaterial sense as it was in a material sense. This is corroborated by a renowned
scholar of Turkish-American relations, who, commenting on the possible US cut off
of military aid following Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus, stated that the
suspension of US aid ". . . would leave deep psychological scars. Indeed, it would be
this aspect-far more than the physical or economic impact of losing American
supplied equipment and credit-that would haunt the relationship for a long time to
come" (Harris 1975: 72).
Although it is possible that the Turks decided to give up the idea of invasion
because of fears that the Americans would discontinue economic aid to Turkey, there
is no conclusive evidence that this was the case. It is true that Turkey was the
recipient of much foreign economic assistance, and that the United States provided
the major portion of this aid. However, the only specific account of Turkey's foreign
policy decision making constraints related to international economic assistance during
this period known to the author (Tuncer, 1975) does not mention that economic
concerns affected the Inonu government's decision to cancel the invasion of Cyprus.
Rather, this article states that the Turks were so satisfied with Turkish-US relations
before the crisis that they had never considered the extent to which they were
dependent on US economic aid (1975: 224), and that only after the crisis did Turkish
intellectuals begin to discuss the extent to which they economically dependent on US
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aid. Furthermore, even if the US had made threats concerning the discontinuation of
economic aid to Turkey, the reality of the US following through on these threats
would have been questionable, just as the likelihood that the US would militarily
abandon Turkey in the event of Soviet invasion was questionable.
It is interesting to compare Turkey's actions with those of Greece during this
period. Both were members of NATO and both were dependent on the US for
economic aid. The Greeks did not choose to consult NATO when they made
decisions, nor did they announce the measures that they would undertake to bring
about a favorable decision on Cyprus. In April 1964, the Greek Cypriots, having
numerical superiority, began to push the Turkish Cypriots back, culminating in the
Greek Cypriot offensive against Kyrenia Castle in northeast Cyprus. Following the
offensive, the Turkish foreign minister told the press that he expected the UN
peacekeeping force to increase its efforts at maintaining order on Cyprus (Kosut,
116). Displaying less confidence in the UN, Turkish Cypriots immediately ·asked
Turkey for military assistance. The Turks then claimed that their ethnic brethren on
Cyprus might suffer "genocide" at the hands of the Greek Cypriots (Davison, 160),
but only made threatening gestures and launched no invasion. They did however
secretly send some troops to Cyprus. At about this time the Greek Cypriots also
asked for Greek assistance. Instead of acting tentatively as the Turks had, the Greeks
secretly sent some 10,000 men to Cyprus, many more than the Turks had, for the
purpose of organizing and commanding the Greek Cypriots (Joseph, 44). Whereas
the Turks advertised their plans and waited for NATO and US approval, the Greeks
acted to change the situation on Cyprus in a more independent fashion.
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Though not containing conclusive proof of the reason that the Turks cancelled
their invasion of Cyprus, the correspondence between President Johnson and Prime
Minister Inonu at the time of the crisis demonstrates the understanding that each party
had concerning the relationship between the two. In the Johnson letter, the President
appealed to the Turkish prime minister on grounds of friendship, writing, "I put it to
you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government,
in effect, to present a unilateral decision of such consequence to an ally who has been
such a staunch supporter over the years" (Geyelin, 1 15). Johnson's reference to the
nature of US-Turkish friendship may possibly indicate his understanding of how
Turkey viewed the relationship and the advantage that the US had in demanding
cancellation of the invasion due to the relationship.
Prime Minister Inonu's communication with Johnson reflected both the
disillusionment that he felt concerning the nature of the supposed special relationship
between the two countries and his defense of Turkey's international behavior vis-a
vis international organizations. Referring to Johnson's suggestion that Turkey might
intend to invade Cyprus with the goal of sacking the island instead of invading merely
to protect Turkish compatriots, he stated that:
The reason for my sorrow is that our ally, the Government of
the United States, could think that Turkey might lay aside the
principle constituting the foundation of her foreign policy, i.e.,
absolute loyalty to international law, commitments and
obligations, as factually evidenced in many circumstances well
known to the United States (Inonu, 390).
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Further commenting on Turkey's commitment and allegiance to the UN, Inonu
claimed that:

. . . Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the most loyal
members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The
Turkish people has spared no effort to safeguard the principles
of the United Nations Charter, and has even sacrificed hers sons
for this cause. Turkey has never failed in supporting this organization
and, in order to secure its proper functioning, has borne great moral
and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing financial
difficulties (Inonu, 392).

Inonu's correspondence with Johnson indicates more than just disappointment
at being deterred from the invasion of Cyprus, it also reflects the national frustration
and rejection that follow from the rebuff of a friend. This may provide an answer to
why Turkey did not go ahead and execute its military action against Cyprus. Because
the reality of Soviet invasion and American abandonment in that instance were highly
improbable, some have remarked that Turkey's decision to abide by American wishes
was nai've (Celik 1999: xiii). Instead of being nai've, Turkey may have been simply
acting as it had in the past, placating a strong country of the civilization with which
Turkey wanted to be associated. Inonu himself was likely to have this attitude, as he
was more westernized than past Turkish leaders (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 189- 190) and
refused to, " . . . question the NATO alliance, for to so would have meant questioning
the very foundations on which the Turkish regime rested" (Ahmad, 407).
That Turkey placed so much value in common membership of international
organizations with the United States may have made it even more difficult to
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disregard Johnson's demands. As related in the middle section of this chapter and
included in Inonu's correspondence, being part of and acting part of the organizations
that affiliated it with the West was the overriding motivation of Turkish foreign
policy. That Johnson's threat contained not only American consternation at Turkey's
invasion plans but also directly implied that Turkey would be letting NATO down
made it doubly likely that Turkey would stand down.
The Johnson letter was not made public until after the Turkish elections in
1965. While there is no question that the release of the letter negatively affected
Turkish popular opinion towards the United States, it caused only a brief
consideration concerning whether Turkey should abandon its Western orientation.
The Turks became disillusioned regarding their special bilateral relationship with the
US, but still clearly wanted to be part of the Western world. During 1965 the Turkish
government began talks with the Soviets leading to a modest warming in relations,
but this can be understood of reflecting the overall movement towards detente that
was occurring during the middle 1960s (with the exception of Southeast Asia).
Instead of joining either the Communist Bloc or moving toward nonalignment, during
the late 1960s the Turks began to look toward the European Community to replace
close ties with the US, in effect replacing one Western friend with another (Ince,
262). Just as the Turks had earlier been drawn toward a strong friendship with the US
for cultural reasons, riow it was drawing closer to l�urope for those same reasons
(Tachau, 198).
Concerning the Cyprus issue, after 1965 the Turks were careful to maintain
their NATO and the UN membership in good standing (the Turks have been
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unsuccessful in gaining EU membership) while still attempting to control events on
the island. Instead of going away, the problems between the Turkish and Greek
ethnic groups on Cyprus repeatedly flared up during the late sixties and early
seventies. In 1967 the Turks again threatened to invade but were dissuaded by the
United States and Great Britain. In the early 70s, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit
renewed Turkey' s pledge to NATO with the intention of generally discussing the
problems in the Western Alliance, specifically including the Cyprus Crisis (Ince,
280).
During 1 974, of course, the Turks finally did successfully invade Cyprus.
The Turkish public, acutely aware of Turkish timidity in the past, was overjoyed at
the undertaking and success of the invasion because it seemed to shatter the Turks'
strong inhibitions about acting independently on the world scene (Mango, 44-45).
The US attempted to stop the Turks unilaterally, but failed. Circumstances had
changed in the decade between the two major Cyprus crises. The timing for the
United States could not have been worse as US credibility had been damaged because
of Vietnam and because the US foreign policy bureaucracy was not particularly
capable of acting in a strong and decisive fashion at the time, due to the Watergate
crisis and Nixon's impending resignation (Kissinger, Chapter 7). Also, as U.S.
prestige and influence declined marginally due to Vietnam and Watergate, the United
States was not as strong a representative of the Western world, and, hence, NATO.
While in 1964 President Johnson's letter had expressed US demands that Turkey halt
invasion plans, the specific threat entailed in the letter dealt with the US role as the
leader of NATO and spoke of NATO not protecting Turkey, therefore implying that
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Turkey was causing a general problem within NATO by planning to go to war. For
the Turks, the 1974 decision was different from the 1964 decision in that " .. . the role
played by NATO during the 1974 crisis was minimal, if any . . . " (Joseph, 90). Had
the United States retained the position that it held before the debacle in Vietnam, the
United States might have commanded more respect within NATO and therefore been
successful at deterring Turkey a second time.
As discussed above, the 1974 Turkish move against Cyprus was a deviation
from the pattern of Turkish foreign policy that manifested itself both before and after
the Second World War. During the period from the beginning of the Republic until
the end of the Cold War, under circumstances where the West was a coherent entity,
the Turks strongly sought membership in Western based � nternational organizations
and the approval of the most important members of these organizations. This
inclination was the outcome of a combination of national culture and the
contemporary international social environment and was a significant factor in Turkish
foreign policy decision-making. If Turkey did not actually defer to the Western
powers in all cases that involved a foreign policy decision-making opportunity, the
Turks were more concerned with the outlook and objectives of the Western powers
than most countries that were not historically part of Western civilization.
This pattern was a product of a centuries old identity problem that manifested itself in
the need to be affiliated with an established and strong civilization. The Turkish
decision in 1964 conforms to the pattern of placation of strong countries in the West
after the First World War and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Because the
American threat of NATO abandonment in the event of Soviet attack was a dubious
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one, it is likely that the Turkish need for acceptance and affiliation by the West was a
major factor in the Turkish government's reaction to the Johnson letter. That is not to
say that this was the only factor that caused the Turkish government to cancel the
invasion of Cyprus, but that Turkey's identity problem and corresponding need for
affiliation was a considerable factor in the decision and should not be overlooked or
undervalued.

The Sino-Vietnamese Border War
Historically, Vietnam has been the victim of many border incursions by the
Chinese (Gilks, 2-4), but during the period between World War II an the end of the
Vietnamese-American War in 1975, China and Vietnam maintained a close
relationship in a joint effort to defeat Western imperialism. According to the
Chinese, this close relationship began to unravel after the death of Ho Chi Minh. Ho
had been very adept at maintaining positive relations between China and the Soviet
Union during the first years of the struggle against the United States, but after 1969
no adequate replacement for this role emerged (Pike, 20 1 ). The Vietnamese
Communist victory in 1975 caused deterioration in this relationship, as the Chinese
voiced grievances concerning the victorious communists' treatment of ethnic Chinese
living in the former South Vietnam. More importantly, China became nervous about
increasingly friendly relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The Sino
Soviet split eventually forced the Vietnamese to side with one protector or the other
in their search for support from a major power. Vietnam chose the Soviet Union
because, "Moscow was very powerful, strongly anti-Chinese, and very far away121

therefore the best ally Hanoi could have to preserve its conquests and keep as
independent as possible" (Griffith, 141).
In 1975 China became the only state to give aid to the new Khmer Rouge
regime in Cambodia. As China had not been entirely enthusiastic about the
reunification of Vietnam, it now hoped to foster a strong Cambodian state to resist
Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina (Yahuda, 226). Vietnam countered this by
concluding a ''Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity" with Laos in August 1977. This
in tum led to a Cambodian military incursion into Vietnam the following month.
Beijing received a delegation of Vietnamese leaders in November 1977 with
the intent of discussing future relations between the two states, but these talks only
led to more disagreement and resulted in the Vietnamese delegation's early departure.
In December of that year Vietnam began military operations in Cambodia in response
to continuing border violations by Khmer Rouge troops. This initially led to a cut
back in economic assistance from China. During July of 1978 China made the
decision to discontinue all aid to Vietnam.
In November 1978 the Vietnamese leadership signed a "Treaty of Cooperation
and Friendship" with the Soviet Union. Although this treaty involved economic
assistance and the establishment of refueling bases for Soviet naval vessels, it is clear
that the principal intent of this treaty for both parties was the containment and
deterrence of China (Zagoria and Simon, 158). Vietnam's historical fears of Chinese
encroachment had begun to reassert themselves with the withdrawal of a common
enemy, the United States, from Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union was becoming
increasingly uneasy over China's recent diplomatic successes concerning Japan and
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the United States. The treaty did not stipulate immediate commitment of military
assistance if either party was attacked, neither did it mention any third country.
However, both Brezhnev and Le Duan, the Vietnamese head of state, declared that
China would have to abide by the treaty's implications (Gilks, 218).
Alarmed by the conclusion of the treaty, the Chinese Politburo held a series of
meetings beginning on November 15 and lasting through mid-December (Chen, 85).
It was at this meeting that Chinese leaders first seriously contemplated the details of a
military strike against the Vietnamese, either in Vietnam or in Cambodia. China's top
leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping, finally opted for a punitive strike against Vietnam
itself rather than intervention in Cambodia. This strike, like the operations discussed
above, would not be undertaken with the goal of taking and holding enemy territory
but rather to punish Vietnam. Deng was aware of the risks of such an invasion. In
making the case for the punitive strike, he outlined several possibilities concerning
Soviet intervention that such an operation might provoke. While acknowledging the
risks involved, Deng believed that Soviets would only respond in a limited fashion,
and that the Chinese would be able to handle these limited attacks (Chen, 87).
Feeling protected by their recently concluded agreement, in December 1978
Vietnam commenced with a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. Vietnamese troops
quickly overwhelmed Khmer Rouge forces and secured Phnom Penh, setting up a
new government. China first responded by issuing a joint communique with the
United States stating opposition to Vietnamese domination of Indochina. During
late January and early February Deng visited the United States to complete the
normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC. In discussions
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with President Carter and other U.S. leaders, Deng told them that China would launch
a limited attack against Vietnam (Carter, 206). Carter advised against such an attack
but could not dissuade Deng from his decision to go through with the planned
invasion. Deng' s visit to the United States prompted much criticism within Vietnam,
and ships from the Soviet navy began moving into the South China Sea near Hainan
Island. On February 8 the Soviets to warn the Beijing against " ... overstepping the
forbidden line ... " (Hsu, 825).
This warning went unheeded. On February 16, the day before the invasion
was scheduled, Chinese leaders met in Beijing to confer about the prospects of
coming operation. Deng Xiaoping led the discussion and addressed the issue of
Soviet intervention. While he thought that Soviet forces along the Manchurian border
might harass Chinese troops, " ... Deng assured his listeners that it was unlikely that
they would carry out either a large scale invasion on multiple fronts or an invasion on
a single front" (Ross, 230). In other words, Deng believed that the Soviets would act
similarly to the way they had done during the Ussuri River confrontation of 1969.
In the early hours of February 17, 1979, the PLA unleashed an artillery
barrage and Chinese tanks crossed the Vietnamese border shortly thereafter with the
intent, in the words of Deng Xiaoping, of "teaching Vietnam a lesson." The invading
force was reportedly composed of several hundred thousand men. Chinese forces
advanced ten kilometers on the first day and about half that distance again on the
second day. During the first two days the Vietnamese were severely outnumbered, as
only about 50,000 Vietnamese troops with little combat experience were stationed
near the Sino-Vietnamese border. On the third day Vietnamese resistance stiffened
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and both sides sought to reinforce their armies. By February 20 the level of fighting
had increased and the Chinese military objective, the capture of Lang Son, became
apparent.
The remainder of the first week involved action in or around Lang Son. The
Chinese took the village of Lao Cai, about 25 kilometers inside the border as the
Vietnamese continued to shift forces from Cambodia to the northern front. From Lao
Cai the Chinese launched repeated attacks on Lang Son, sometimes entering the city
itself, only to repeatedly pushed back by the Vietnamese. At the end of the first week
the Chinese opened a second offensive in the southeast with the idea of cutting off the
Vietnamese troops in the Lang Son region.
As the second week began it was becoming apparent that the Chinese were
becoming bogged down and would have difficulty achieving the limited military
goals they it had set, taking Lang Son and destroying some front line Vietnamese
divisions. During the second week the Chinese drove as far forty kilometers inside
Vietnam, but the Vietnamese began making incursions into China at other points
along the border forcing the Chinese to reconsider their plans. Seeking to find a way
to declare victory and then get out, the Chinese sent further reinforcements to Lang
Son and launched stronger artillery barrages in hopes of taking the entire town before
declaring the operation over and retreating. However, by this time some of the best
Vietnamese divisions were arriving to defend Lang Son (up to this point the Chinese
had been fighting against divisions with lesser combat experience and capability).
After several more days of heavy fighting, the Chinese promptly announced that they
would pull back to the original Vietnamese Border and began to slowly withdraw
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having failed to achieve any of their military goals. Although the Chinese claimed
that they had decimated several top Vietnamese divisions, this was clearly not the
case (Chen, 113-115).
The Chinese withdrawal began on March 5 and was completed on March 16.
Each side claimed to have killed more of the enemy than the other, so actual casualty
figures are difficult to estimate but it has been generally established that the total
number of dead on both sides numbered between sixty and seventy thousand with an
equal amount of wounded. (Chen, 113-115; Jacobsen, 103). As the war ended it was
clear that the Vietnamese were gaining strength while whatever capabilities the
Chinese had demonstrated at the outset of the war were beginning to ebb. As more
well trained, better equipped, and more experienced Vietnamese troops were on the
way to the area around Lang Son it is possible that the Chinese could have suffered a
more serious defeat had they not began their withdrawal when they did.
If the strength of the Vietnamese was not enough, the threat of Russian
intervention constantly hung in the air throughout the war. The USSR repeatedly
warned the Chinese that Soviet forces would intervene if the Chinese did not pull
back. On February 18 Moscow demanded that the Chinese get out of Vietnam while
there was still time and on the next day US sources reported that the USSR was
pondering a limited invasion of China (Jacobsen, 98). On the fifth day of the war, the
twenty-first, Russian planes flew over the area of battle, additional ships joined the
Soviet naval task force operating in the South China Sea, and a Soviet military
delegation flew to Hanoi. On February 22, the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister in
Moscow and the Soviet military attache in Hanoi both made statements, the essence
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of which was that the Soviet Union would act to fulfill its treaty obligations to
Vietnam if the Chinese did not promptly withdraw (Chen, 109). As the second week
began Soviet ships reached Haiphong harbor with a shipment of missiles and Soviet
aircraft began to airlift aid into Vietnam. The Soviets only began to lessen pressure
on China as it began to appear likely that the Vietnamese could handle the Chinese
without help. Still, even as late as the end of the second week of hostilities Pravda
was claiming that the war might "expand" if the Chinese did not promptly withdraw
(Jacobsen, 102).
From a strictly military point of view, it is difficult to see why China went
through with its punitive mission against Vietnam. The PLA was far from a modern
force, and many of its problems came to light during the month long conflict. These
problems included the ability to coordinate attacks (PLA artillery fired on PLA
infantry), to adequately estimate resources needed for operations (PLA tanks ran out
of fuel), and to communicate effectively (outdated radio communications, inability to
of troops to recognize commanding officers due to absence of rank insignia on
uniforms) (Short, 332). Simply taking on the Vietnamese alone was a difficult task,
as they had much more recent combat experience and more modern equipment, but
the Chinese also had to be prepared for the contingency of Soviet intervention. For
this reason one must look beyond the balance of military power to comprehend why
the Chinese did attack Vietnam. Concerning the questions of Western military
experts about the prudence of Chinese operations against Vietnam:
They failed to see that China felt both humiliated and betrayed in
its rejection by a former supplicant of favors, and that the feeling
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of betrayal was exacerbated by Vietnam's growing arrogance
toward China and other smaller neighbors, as well as by its alignment
with Russia. Such open hostility, the Chinese felt, had to be dealt
with, or China's credibility would be at stake. Deng also wanted to
show the world that China did not fear war or the threat of Soviet
intervention (Hsu, 827).
Another commentator claims that China undertook the invasion of Vietnam in order
to ' . . . demonstrate China's regional military power, and implicitly to reassert the
traditional Chinese prerogative of "chastising the barbarians" within the traditional
areas of Chinese hegemony' (Jencks, 803).
The Chinese approach to crisis on its borders was both brutal and delicate. On
most occasions the Chinese acted aggressively, seeking to draw blood from their
enemies while sacrificing many of their own soldiers, as the Sino-Vietnamese War
particularly demonstrated. Yet for all their aggressiveness in these situations, the
Chinese were careful to not go too far. Whether they could realistically press their
gains, as against the Indians in 1962, or not, as was true of the Korean War and the
confrontations with the Soviet Union, the Chinese retreated once limited objectives
had been achieved. The show of power demonstrated China's ability to dictate the
situation while simultaneously showing that China was prudent enough not to take on
more than she could handle.
The Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam conformed to this pattern. Deng and
his fellow leaders had no intention of permanently holding any Vietnamese territory
and planned to retreat once several military objectives had been accomplished. It can
be argued that the Chinese were compelled to retreat. Lebow and Stein (1990) define
compellence as a situation in which ". . . threats mad by those identified as defenders
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were designed to stop an adversary from something it was already doing . . . ( 1 990:
362). While the Chinese refused to be deterred, they could be compelled to retreat,
and the strength of the Vietnamese combined with the recurring Russian threats may
have compelled the PLA to wind down the war for fear of suffering a substantial
defeat before they attained all of their military goals. Compellence, however, should
not be confused with deterrence.
That fact that China may have been compelled to retreat does not mean that
the Chinese were not risk acceptant. The Chinese approach reflected China' s need to
see itself as a great power and also its limited military potential. In the militarily
charged environment of the twentieth century, the way to demonstrate great power
status was to engage in military conflict with other great powers. The Chinese did
this at almost every opportunity, sending their armies into action against American,
Soviet, Indian, and Vietnamese forces within a period of thirty years. While the
Chinese withdrew after a limited amount of action, with all these confrontations came
the possibility of uncontrolled escalation in which China could not match the power
of the Soviets or the Americans. The Chinese were ready to accept these risks.
Deng Xiaoping' s decision to invade Vietnam involved considerable risks.
The PLA' s state of readiness for such an undertaking was certainly in question, owing
to the fact that much of its weaponry was out of date and that it had not been involved
in an operation of this nature since the early sixties. That Deng and other senior
leaders were fearful of encirclement by the Soviet Union and its allies is completely
understandable, but this does not mean an operation like the one against Vietnam was
the only solution to this problem. China's one strength vis-a-vis the Vietnamese and
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Russians was the sheer number of men it could put into battle, but this strength would
have been better employed in a defensive undertaking such as the People's War
strategy, the strategy that China supposedly preferred over all others. However,
waiting for the enemy to take the initiative was did not conform to China's cultural
need to feel that it was a great power, nor did it conform to revolutionary Marxist
tenets. One can only understand why China acted as it did by understanding these
cultural and social factors.

Comparing the Decisions
It is in the comparison of the two cases of immediate extended deterrence that
the strength of cultural influence on foreign policy decision-making is most clearly
illustrated. Because these cases are comparable some standard of equal condition is
established that allows us to isolate the respective cultural traits and patterns of the
Turks and Chinese that had important implications for the decisions reached in the
cases. As with all cases of immediate extended deterrence, these cases involved
responses to threats. It is in the divergent nature of the responses to the threats that
cultural influences are demonstrated.
The American threat to abandon the Turks if the Turkish invasion of Cyprus
provoked Soviet intervention has been analyzed above. To briefly summarize,
President Johnson informed the Turks that if they did not immediately cease
preparations for invasion, the United States would encourage all other members of
NATO to allow Turkey to be overrun by Soviet forces should the Soviets choose to
take advantage of the situation. The hollowness of this threat was also related in
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Chapter IV. It was extremely unlikely that the contingency under which the threat
was applicable, a Soviet advance over the Turkish border, would take place. In the
years since the Second World War the Soviets had not directly intervened in a non
Communist state, and this was even more unlikely in the middle 1960s when Cold
War tensions in Europe were beginning soften.
However, in the unlikely event that Soviets did exploit a conflict between
Greece and Turkey and made the decision to move on Turkey, it is even more
unlikely that the Americans would have remained outside the fray. Soviet success in
such a venture would mean control of the Europe' s southwestern flank and a much
increased presence in the Mediterranean. The guiding American policy for the era,
containment of communi sm, would have been in danger of unraveling had the US
refused to aid Turkey in the event of Soviet invasion.
Despite the unlikelihood that the contingency, Soviet invasion, for the
American threat would develop and the even less likely circumstance that the US
would make good on its threat of abandonment if a Soviet invasion did take place, the
Turks knuckled under and accepted Johnson's direction . The central question is why
they did so. While the Turks may have had an inadequate number of landing craft
and lacked experience in amphibious warfare, this had not prohibited them from
making invasion preparations. Only with the arrival of the Johnson letter did the
Turks decide to cancel the invasion. The Turkish decision only makes since when
understood within the greater pattern of Turkish foreign policy decision making that
began with the establishment of the Turkish Republic but was related to much older,
traditional ways of dealing with the rest of the world.
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It is inadequate to simply state that the Turks were timid in this instance and
chalk it up the fickle nature of human affairs. The Turkish decision represents a lack
of capacity to act independently on the world scene that had been a characteristic of
Turkish interaction in the world for at least a thousand years. This characteristic was
cultural in nature because it grew out of the larger social and historical environment
in which the Turks had existed. From the time the first Turkish tribes had began their
westward migration from the steppes of Central Asia, they had carried with them a
sense of dislocation and a corresponding desire for stability that could only be gained
through affiliation. After much wandering and experimentation they finally settled
into their role as the military guardians of the Ottoman Empire, only to see that
empire go into decline and ultimately collapse. When forced to assert their
independence or be scattered to the ends of the earth, the Turks successfully fought to
maintain their collective identity, but still looked for larger bonds of affiliation. The
superiority of Western civilization and its modem form of social attachment, the
international organization, provided the opportunity for the Turks to fulfill what was
for them a natural role on the world scene. Only by understanding this larger context
can the decision by the Inonu government in 1964 be completely comprehended.
The Turks had repeatedly shown more concern over the wider foreign policy
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objectives of Western international organizations than over issues that specifically
affected Turkey. This pattern began was initiated when the Turks imposed economic
sanctions on Italy, thereby damaging economic relations between Italy and Turkey, at
the behest of the League of Nations during the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935. Following
the Second World War, the Turks sent troops to participate in the Korean War,
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leading not only to Turkish casualties on the battlefield but to domestic problems
caused by the Bulgaria's ejection of 200,000 ethnic Turks. In the late 1950s, the
Turks volunteered to base nuclear missiles on their territory, something that other
members of NATO refused to do. This made Turkey a likely target for a Soviet
nuclear strike in the event of a nuclear war between the countries of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. The Turks customarily accepted burdens and risks for the sake of
maintaining good standing within Western international organizations, and the
decision to refrain from invading Cyprus in the summer of 1964 is one more instance
in this pattern.
The Turkish decision is brought into high relief when compared with the
Chinese decision to disregard Soviet threats and proceed with its plans to punish
Vietnam. The Soviet threat against the Chinese was vague, but it involved the
possibility of a two front war at a time when China was not in a particularly strong
position to face an international crisis. As related in Chapter V, Deng Xiaoping
expected the Soviets to harass Chinese troops on the Manchurian border. In other
words, Deng was ready to accept possibility of Chinese forces being involved in
hostilities on both its northern and southern borders.
This decision has much in common with decisions that were _made during
Mao's rule. In 1950 the Chinese exposed themselves to large degree of risk by
entering the Korean War. China entered the war with the knowledge that it was
exposing itself to the possibility of American bombing of Chinese cities and
American support of an invasion of the Chinese mainland by the Nationalist Chinese
on Taiwan. By entering the war the Chinese Communists were putting all that they
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had won during the revolution in jeopardy. While the Chinese decision to strike
against India in 1962 involved little initial risk, once again it did involve the
possibility of a two front war as relations between the Soviets and Indians had been
growing increasingly positive during the early 1 960s. The Chinese decision to
engage Soviet forces along the Manchurian border in 1 969 demonstrated a greater
ability to accept risk. The Chinese were ready for the war to escalate to the highest
level, this borne out by the fact that the Chinese had built an underground city in
Beijing to be used in the event to Soviet nuclear attack. Understood within the
context of these decisions, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1 979 seems to be a
typical foreign policy encounter for China during the postwar era, regardless of the
degree of risk involved.
Deng's decision to accept this possibility was made with the knowledge that the
People's Liberation Army was militarily inferior to the opposition forces that it might
have to face. Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1 966 many senior
military officers had been purged and the army had been more involved in restoring
and maintaining domestic peace than preparing for war. While China had improved
its nuclear arsenal to some degree since its first successful atomic test in 1964, the
Chinese nuclear arsenal still paled in comparison to that of the Soviets. The gap
between the conventional capabilities of the Chinese and the Russians and
Vietnamese was also great. Since the Cultural Revolution China had done very little
to modernize its conventional forces, while the Russians had continually updated their
conventional capabilities and also supplied North Vietnamese Army with modem
equipment. The Chinese were able to escape a two front war by pulling out of
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Vietnam before Soviet intervention, but the Chinese had no way of being completely
sure at what point the Soviets would decide that enough was enough. Therefore, it is
extremely plausible to suggest that Deng's decision to go forward with the invasion
of Vietnam in the face of Soviet warnings not to do so can be understood as part of a
pattern of contemporary Chinese foreign policy that was rooted in much older aspects
of Chinese culture.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND
IMPLICATIONS

Although national culture is only one of many influences on foreign policy
decision-making, it should not be overlooked. Because it is difficult to isolate culture
as factor influencing policy, many have done just that. However, by assessing state
actions over time, the cultural variable can be brought into focus. Describing culture
and foreign policy in Belgium and the Netherlands, Marijke Breuning states that,
" . . . observed patterns of behavior across time and cross-nationally can lead to the
conclusion that state A's foreign policy behavior is bounded in one way, while state
B's is constrained another way" (1997: 104). This is exactly what the foregoing
chapters have sought to demonstrate.
The Turks and the Chinese have historically had very different conceptions of
the part that they should play on the world scene. Despite the Turks' power within
the Ottoman Empire, the Turks found more legitimacy in the religion, traditions, and
language of the other groups within the empire, the Arabs and Persians, than in their
own. While the First World War shattered the Ottoman Empire, the Turks continued
to look to other countries to define themselves. The Chinese, on the other hand,
were completely secure, perhaps overly secure, within their cultural tradition. China
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found it very difficult to believe that any other state could rival it in terms of
government and culture. It is for this reason that the Chinese experience with
modernization has been so painful.
The First World War marked a watershed in world history and international
relations. As the war drew to close the importance of international ideology and
international organizations became apparent. These concepts affected the
international outlook of all states and presented a way for states to update their
traditional methods of dealing with the world. Turkey and China were no exception.
During the twentieth century, Turkey consistently identified itself with the Western
powers, sometimes to its own detriment. Turkey's experience with the League of
Nations, the Korean War, the gaining of NATO membership, the installation of
NATO missiles on Turkish soil, and other incidents all demonstrate that the Turks
were ready to make the interests of leading countries of the West Turkey's interests,
even if these powerful countries were less than willing to reciprocate. By contrast,
the Chinese repeatedly attempted to demonstrate that they could operate
independently and aggressively in the international arena, even if they had not
reached the level of economic and military modernization that the leading Western
states and the Soviet Union had. Chinese intervention in the Korean War, invasion of
India, and the military operations that the Chinese undertook on the Soviet border all
serve to illustrate this tendency.
Turkey's decision to heed American threats and back down from invading
Cyprus in 1964 and China's invasion of Vietnam in spite of Soviet warnings not to do
so in l979 bring culture's effect on foreign policy into sharper focus. China was
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certainly more powerful than Turkey, but it faced the same circumstances, a
superpower warning not to go forward with an invasion of a third party state.
Moreover, the risks for the Chinese in 1979 were greater than those of the Turks in
1979. Regarding the American threats to abandon Turkey in the event of a Soviet
intervention and discontinue military support, the Soviets were unlikely to intervene
in a clash between the Turks and Greeks over Cyprus and even more unlikely that the
United States would not react to this contingency, and the Turks could have
purchased arms elsewhere. The Chinese faced a possible two front war if they went
through with their punitive attack against Vietnam. Turkey was risk averse and
tentative in 1964 because challenging the United States was unthinkable for a state
that attached so much of its identity to being friends with the United States and being
part of Western international organizations. The Chinese were more risk acceptant
and more inclined toward independent action in 1979 because of the way that China
had traditionally viewed the world, that is, that China was a great power and should
act accordingly.
Looking Forward
The rapid chain of events that occurred between 1989 and 1992, the Soviet
withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the collapse of
the Soviet Union, marked the end of the global ideological conflict that began during
the closing years of the First World War. The triumphant West, led by the United
States, looked to promote democratization in former Communist countries, expand
export markets, and increase the power and membership of international
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organizations based on Western principles, such as the World Trade Organization. In
the years immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc there were hopes
that end of capitalist/communist conflict might also mean the end of warfare itself.
While these hopes were quickly extinguished, it was still abundantly clear that the
post-Cold War world was very different from the world before 1989.
More than a decade has passed and the characteristics that may define this
new era of international relations are slowly coming into focus. Nation-states have
demonstrated an increased interest in economic power. This has led to the
development of more supranational organizations for the purpose of regulating
international trade, causing states to look for new avenues for cooperation and adopt
similar political and economic institutions. However, economic competition is still
just that, competition. Even if all states should become capitalist and democratic,
they still have some mutually exclusive interests, such as the need for access to scarce
resources. If not properly managed, there is a continuing possibility that economic
conflict may degenerate into violent conflict.
Also, with the demise of ideology as a motivating force, older forms of rivalry
began to assert themselves. During the 1990s groups within the same state and in
different states went to war over ethnic and religious issues, the prime examples being
the war in Southern Europe and the intertribal conflict in East Africa. Stateless
groups have increasingly resorted to violence in hopes of gaining wider attention for
their demands. This has happened despite the fact that the US holds a tremendous
advantage in military power because US resources, however great, are still limited.
Rather than being a period in which violent conflict occurred much less frequently as
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some hoped during the immediate post-Cold War years, the new era of international
relations increasingly looks as if it will be defined by issues of economics and
ethnicity, and without wisdom and patience these issues will have the same ability to
produce violent conflict as did ideology.
These changes in the international system have caused corresponding changes
in the foreign policies of states, including those of Turkey and China. The Turks still
seek to become more integrated into the West, but the role they play had been altered
by new circumstances. Instead of guarding the southern frontier of the Soviet Union,
the Turks now look to advance Western interests in the Middle East. Turkey was a
major staging area for coalition forces during the Gulf War. It also provides
diplomatic and intelligence links between the US and European powers and Middle
Eastern states. Potentially more important is the fact that Turkey is the oldest secular
and democratic state with a primarily Islamic population. Turkey may be the model
to which moderate Islamic states in the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, and
South Asia aspire (Celik, 122). While the Turks are certain to have continuing
identity problems, foreign policies that encourage Islamic governments to become
more Western in their orientation will both increase Turkey' s value within the West
and erode some of the differences between the West and the Middle East that are the
root of Turkey' s identity concerns.
The collapse of the Soviet Union also caused a transition in Chinese foreign
policy. That China is still striving to attain great power status, a status that Chinese
believe their state rightfully deserves, has been confirmed by both Chinese and
Western scholars (Wang 1999, Deng 1999, Harris 2000). However, in keeping with
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the new circumstances since the end of the Cold War the Chinese have undertaken a
broader range of methods to achieve this status. Economic reforms begun in the
1980s were accelerated in the early 1 990s with the establishment of special economic
zones that encourage foreign investment. China also sought membership in more
international organizations and attempted to become a more responsible power in the
eyes of the world. Furthermore, China has not undertaken any military action outside
its borders during the post-Cold War era. While the Chinese have placed a high
priority on the modernization of its military forces and occasionally threatened their
use, they have been much more conservative in their foreign policy statements and
behavior since the demise of the charged ideological confrontation of the Cold War.

Implications
With regards to the implications of this study, a brief word concerning the
importance of this study for general social science will be briefly discussed first.
Then the implications for international relations theory and the practice of foreign
policy will be related.
Concerning social science in general, this study demonstrates a way to
overcome the separation between two basic categories of inquiry within social
science, nomothetic and ideographic. As related in Chapter I, nomothetic science
rests on three basic assumptions (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 5-7). First, social
science is capable of producing general statements by means of finding general
patterns. Also, scientific theory should employ deductive logic. Finally, causal
relationships can be derived by discovering spatio-temporal relationships between
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events. Ideographic research, on the other hand, isolates a concrete unit of analysis
and asserts that the internal dialectic of this unit is unique and cannot be found
elsewhere (Galtung: 108).
This division between nomothetic and ideographic research largely
corresponds to the dividing line between the separate fields of history and
anthropology. Historians are concerned with change over time whereas
anthropologists focus on a specific community of people during a specific period of
time and try to discern the essence of that community. This division limits the
amount of understanding that could potentially be gained in any historical,
anthropological, sociological, or political enquiry. By seeking to understand how
societal values are transformed in action over time, a deeper and more sophisticated
understanding of both the nature of specific societies and the nature of change can be
gained. A method similar to the one used in this study could be employed to study
almost any type of group or groups (national, provincial, local) and how these groups
reacted to changing circumstances.
Another important implication that this study suggests pertains to the
relationship between leadership and culture. Both of the cases analyzed in this study
describe decisions that conformed to earlier decision making patterns. These patterns
extended beyond the tenure of any one leader, but it must be admitted that certain
leaders, Ataturk and Mao in the cases presented here, inaugurated these patterns.
Though neither Ataturk nor Mao was democratically elected, they were able to take
and maintain power because each at some level understood the desires and nature of
his people. What is more, they were able to understand that the international
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environment either was changing or had changed, and that they must find a way to
update or modernize the ideas and sentiments of their respective nations. This was
the only way that identity could be retained. To simply cling to the old would mean a
future without hope, but to completely abandon tradition would mean the destruction
of identity. In this sense Mao and Ataturk can be compared with Ho Chi Minh, for,
"In times of crisis the Vietnamese looked for a particular kind of leader. A Hitler or a
Joseph McCarthy or an Abraham Lincoln would have had no success in Vietnam, for
they did not conform to the model laid down in the depths of Vietnamese history"
(Fitzgerald, 30).
This study also contains important implications for general international
relations theory. In his chapter "Conclusion: The End of the Cold War-What Have
We Learned?" Richard Hermann claims that international relations theory after the
Cold War suffers from the same problems that it did before the demise of the Soviet
Union. He believes that international relations theorists continue to separate
themselves into two separate camps, one group that relies on structural assumptions
regarding the international system and a second group that is only concerned with
foreign policy decision-making (1995: 277). Herman argues that these two groups
have not been particularly receptive to each other's ideas, nor has either group been
as effective as it might at developing the type of theory that each considers to be
within its area of expertise.
To overcome these deficiencies, Hermann first advocates the reintegration of
area specialists into the process of building middle level international relations theory
(1995: 278). By using information provided by area specialists, international
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relations theorists will have a better empirical basis for understanding the type of
patterns certain states are likely to conform to in their international behavior.
Hermann then states that once this has been accomplished the ". . .international system
would thus be operationally defined not only by the distribution of material power
bases among the great powers but also by the distribution of interests and aims."
(1995: 278).
The present study not only attempts to overcome these deficiencies of
international relations theory that Hermann identifies, but also seeks to demonstrate
how to go beyond Hermann's recommendations for improving international relations
theory. Hermann claims that by marrying structural ideas concerning capabilities to
an understanding of how states' conceive the world is the answer to curing the long
standing sickness of international relations theory. This study certainly attempts to
account for the specific international outlooks of individual states and where these
specific understandings originate. While not focusing on capabilities, this project
certainly does not exclude discussion of capabilities. Undoubtedly, as even Wendt
has remarked, ". . . the distribution and composition of material capabilities at any
given moment help define the possibilities of our action" (1999: 113). The cases
included in this study were chosen because they illustrate the weakness of relying
solely on capability ratios, but for this very reason capability ratios had to be
compared with other factors influencing decision making in these specific cases and
were found wanting.
What Hermann does not allow for are any types of international social factors
other than those based on the perception of material capabilities. Hermann claims
144

that international relations theory is not culpable for its failure to explain the end of
the Cold War ( 1 995: 279). He does this because his recommendations for improving
international relations theory are incomplete. Although the salience of capabilities
was not the objective of this study, they are undoubtedly important. This truth is
matched by the importance of the specific ways the groups of people that inhabit
individual states see the world. But beyond these two factors there is a third that
should not be overlooked. Herman believes that international relations theory could
not predict the end of the Cold War because the Cold War, according to him, could
not and cannot be defined as a single entity (1995 : 279). In contrast, this study
attempts to show that not just the Cold War but rather the entire period from the end
of the First World War until 1989, as related in chapter two, was a single entity. This
entity was based on certain social characteristics of the international system, and by
understanding how these systemic social characteristics interact with capabilities and
area specific perspectives, we can understand more about both the nature of the
international system and why certain international events occur.
The Turkish and Chinese cases explained in chapters four and five
demonstrate how countries update the practice of their cultural values and
understandings of their place in the world according to social changes in the
international system. Cultural essence survives through the process of evolution, and
this evolution is a process that is punctuated by shifts in the international social
system. When events trigger a radical change in the international social system,
states must react by applying traditional perspectives to new circumstances. What
emerges is a different form of foreign policy practice, but one that is still based on
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certain constant ideas about a state's international role. The very fact that states are
embarking on different courses of foreign policy practice, such as the Turkish move
to join the West or the Chinese tendency to use force in international confrontations
during the period discussed in this study, should indicate that a transition in the
international social system is occurring.
One of the great weaknesses of international relations theory has been its
inability to foresee changes on the international scene. Nothing demonstrated this
inability more than the collapse of the Soviet Union and the corresponding end of the
Cold War. The theory presented in this study, on the other hand, represents a
dynamic perspective on international relations. While the cases studies related in
chapters five and six are accounts of decisions that conform to continuous patterns,
these patterns are temporally limited manifestations of traditional values that have
been held for many centuries. These manifestations took the form the forms
described in chapters four and five because of the changes in the international
systems that came about during the First World War.
The altering of intemational forms of organization and thought that were
wrought by the First World War was related to many changes taking place in the
world before the war. While these changes were triggered by the war, they were the
result of developments in technological, organizational, and philosophical fields
(which are extremely difficult to separate) before the war. Political change was
precipitated by changes in general social and technological environment. It may be
that this is true not just of the First World War but also of other eras of international
history. By gaining an understanding of changes in areas outside of but related to
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international politics those scholars trying to understand transition in international
politics may at the very least be able to articulate the types of conditions that might
favor a general alteration in the social nature of the international system.
While international relations scholars should be seeking to understand the
nature of the international social environment and how and when this environment
experiences transformation, this does not mean that they should be looking for or
expecting the advent of a more humane and pacific era of international relations.
Every era of international history will have both better and worse circumstances
compared to the eras that both precede and follow it. The era that this study analyzed,
the period between the First World War and the end of the Cold War, experienced
violence and warfare on an unprecedented scale yet also experienced the demise of
colonialism and impressive advances in the area of international organization. The
post-Cold war period, about which we can only begin (but we can begin) to speculate,
has certainly experienced a significant decrease in the threat of nuclear war on a large
scale while also witnessing an alarming increase in international terrorism. The
world is never going to be completely free of problems, but a better understanding of
the types of problems at present and on the horizon will enable us to deal more
effectively with them when they do occur.
In this regard, this study can be understood as an attempt to repudiate
structural (neo )realism but to confirm the wisdom of classical realism. Classical
realists have generally acknowledged the social nature of international relations. The
classical realist outlook is well characterized by the statement that:
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Realism ultimately agrees that the 'necessitous' elements of the
international system are largely social constructions generated
by human practices, but it retains an ambivalence about human
motivations which dictates a skeptical position towards the
possibility of overcoming estrangement (Murray, 194).
After all, classical realists have been among the most adept social scientists in
the area of understanding and predicting change. Two obvious examples are
Rheinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan. Writing in the early thirties, Niebhur [1960
(1932)] foresaw many international and domestic developments that would come to
pass in later decades. Among these was the inevitability of another Franco-German
war [1960 (1932): 110], the coming of a bipolar world in which the East would be
dominated by communism while the West would coalesce around the idea of the
democratic welfare state (191), and the nature of American civil rights movement
during the 1950s and 1960s (252-254). What is most interesting about these
predictions is that Niebuhr made them in the face of the prevailing social wisdom of
· the day. During the late 1920s and early 1930s many who were interested in
international affairs believed that another European war was unlikely and that the

most developed nations were the ones most likely to adopt communism. Niebuhr was
capable of making these predictions because he understood the societal characteristics
of individual states in conjunction with the social characteristics of the international
system during that time.
Similarly, through his understanding of Russian culture and history and the
nature of communist ideology, Kennan correctly anticipated how the Cold War would
end. For more than forty years Kennan maintained that the US need only remain firm
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but patient and history itself would be the undoing of the Soviet Union (Kennan 1987:
14). Kennan held to this prescription while other strategies for dealing with the
Soviets, such as Dulles' idea of rolling back Soviet gains in Eastern Europe or ideas
of pre-empting a "certain" Soviet attack with a nuclear strike, came and went.
By combining an understanding of social nature of the international system
and cultures of specific states, international scholars, and especially those with a
classical real orientation, can offer useful explanations, predictions, and prescriptions
for the present century just as Niebuhr and Kennan did for the last. If globalization is
to be one of the defining social characteristics of the international system in the new
century, then social scientists must make every effort to understand what forms
globalization will take. Classical realists have an important role to play in this task.
While globalization could be understood as overcoming the estrangement among
nations on which much of realism is based, it can also be understood as just one more
period of international history during which states develop new forms of cooperation
but are still confronted with the age old questions of international politics. Just as
some norms and practices may become increasingly standardized the world over, the
citizens of nation-states may become more instead of less identified with the national
society of which they are a part. This is because:

The nation . . . becomes represented through a set of more or
less coherent images and memories which deals with the
crucial questions of the origins, difference and distinctiveness
of a people. In this sense it has a quasi-religious basis, as it is
able to answer some of the questions of theodicy in a world
which is subject to processes of secularization (Featherstone,
109).
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Recent expressions of nationalist sentiment in China, the Middle East, and even
Western Europe have demonstrated this trend during the best of economic times of
the late 1990s. By seeking to gain an understanding of what types of issues and
situations will bring states into cooperation or conflict during an age of globalism,
realists can make an invaluable contribution to our general comprehension of what
the international system will be like in future decades.
Now, this being said, it is certainly easier to describe these types of
developments in hindsight. It is much easier to understand the social nature of the
international system in 1952 from the perspective of 2002 than it was from the
perspective of 1952. Patterns of activity occur over time, and only by having time to
observe them can we identify them as patterns. Moreover, due to unique
circumstances some societies may not be able to maintain pattern like behavior in
their foreign policies. Although all national policies and actions are based to some
extent on local culture and experience, states that have endured dramatic upheaval
such as being defeated in war and subsequently occupied may alter the way they
express their cultural heritage because they have no choice. (For a more in depth
consideration of this phenomenon see Eckstein 1988). Here, I am thinking of the
defeated fascist states after World War II. Germany and Japan, occupied by the
victorious powers (particularly the US, which even today maintains bases in these
countries) gave up militarism and instead focused almost solely on economic growth.
Nevertheless, by understanding the historical perspectives that specific
societies hold and thinking about them in conjunction with the new type of social
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forms that define the present international system our speculation may be much better
informed. It is toward these types of goals that international relations scholars should
be working.
The importance of this undertaking should not be underestimated. It is the
duty of international relations scholars to articulate the different forms that the
international future might take. Anything less is an abdication of responsibility. This
is exceedingly more important than the type of activities that many international
relations scholars are presently involved, which often amount to research that is
undertaken for the purpose of impressing colleagues within the field rather than
affecting anything that goes on outside of the academic world. It is unquestionably
true that international relations scholars should be assessing the impact of trade flows
and capability ratios, but they must also pursue the type of research advocated in this
study.
This means that international relations scholars must become more concerned
and involved with the practice of foreign policy, an area for which this study also has
implications. One of the main objectives of this study has been to demonstrate that
national culture constrains foreign policy decision-making. Because this is the case,
this information has the potential to be very relevant for American foreign policy
decision makers and analysts. In his attempt to narrow the divide between
international relations theory and foreign policy, George claims that, ''To deal
effectively with other states, policymakers need what is often referred to as a correct
image of the opponent" (1993 : 125). To obtain this correct image, George advocates
developing actor specific models to be employed by decision makers when needed.
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In other words, social scientists can make a contribution in the area of national policy
by studying the culture, ideology, and outlook of individual countries. When a crisis
arises involving a particular country, this base of information may be invaluable to
the responsible officials who must make decisions.
Foreign policy decisions involving deterrence are especially important for
the United States. This is so because the US is the only remaining superpower and
has an interest in maintaining the existing international order that is beneficial for US
security and economic interests. As the strongest member of the international
community, the US plays an important role in almost all international issues and
develops relationships with many different countries. Therefore, it is only normal
that at times American interests will clash with those of other states. When this
happens the US seeks to resolve issues with a minimum use of force so that the
integrity of the existing international order, an order that is favorable to the pursuit of
American interests, will not come into question. An increased understanding of how
other countries will act and to what types of offers or threats they will respond can
make the practice of deterrence more effective. This study and others like it represent
a significant way to develop this type of information.
The principle aim of this study has been to demonstrate that the combined influence
of national culture and temporally limited social characteristics of the international
system have a strong ability to constrain foreign policy decision making. It is hoped
that other social scientists interested in foreign policy studies and international
relations theory will make use of the general model used in this study. That is not to
say that others need to adhere to the specific details of the model as employed here.
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The starting and ending dates on periods of international history and the specific
social characteristics that define them are open for interpretation. Possibly shorter or
longer periods with different overriding social characteristics may yield more
interesting insights than those offered here. Perhaps an additional unit of analysis, the
individual leader' s psychological makeup, could be integrated into the model with the
object of gaining greater understanding concerning specific instances of foreign
policy decision-making. What is more certain is that researchers using models with
more than one level of analysis will be able to gain a more textured and
comprehensive understanding of both foreign policy and international relations.
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